



US Violent Extremists Likely Shifting Focus to Targeted Physical Threats in 2025

Targeted attacks against high-profile personnel have likely become the predominant violent extremist threat to most United States-based public and private sector entities.

During the next twelve months, the US faces a heightened threat environment from violent extremists due to a confluence of geopolitical and domestic political trends and new technologies.

Violent extremists are especially likely to target public and private sector executives, infrastructure and government facilities, and the defense contractor, education, and insurance sectors.

Executive Summary

The predominant threats to most public and private sector entities from United States (US)-based domestic violent extremists (DVEs) during the next twelve months will likely come in the form of targeted attacks against personnel and sabotage of facilities. These threats likely surpass the risk of DVE mass-casualty terrorist attacks due to their elevated frequency, success rate, and impact on the targeted entity's operations. While certain categories of homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) and some DVEs will almost certainly continue to plan and threaten mass-casualty attacks, recent high-profile assassinations and assassination attempts in the US have very likely increased the probability of DVEs considering limited-scope methods. Violent extremists have almost certainly glorified the alleged perpetrators of these attacks and promoted narratives suggesting that targeted attacks against high-profile public figures more effectively achieve their political and ideological goals than mass-casualty attacks.

To support attack plots and bolster their operational footprint in 2025 and early 2026, HVEs and DVEs will almost certainly continue issuing online threats; stalking, harassing, and physically approaching victims; and conducting sabotage, surveillance, disruptive demonstrations, doxing, and swatting. As in previous years, personnel and facilities associated with racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, the LGBTQIA+ community, US federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies (particularly judicial and law enforcement agencies), specific private industry sectors (defense contractors, healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, financial and insurance agencies), and critical infrastructure providers are at heightened risk from HVE and DVE threat activities during the next twelve months.

Polarizing geopolitical and domestic political issues — especially conflicts in the Middle East involving Israel, the 2024 fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and US immigration enforcement policies — will almost certainly continue to mobilize HVEs and DVEs during the next twelve months. While expected tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with US violent extremists are unlikely to significantly change in the short term, DVEs and HVEs are very likely to accelerate adoption of new technologies, such as commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), generative artificial intelligence (AI), end-to-end encrypted communications platforms, cryptocurrencies, and 3D printing, to enhance their operational capabilities.

Rapidly shifting developments in the violent extremist threat landscape in the US and changing priorities of US federal law enforcement and homeland security agencies could place more of the onus on state and local governments and the private sector to manage their own counterterrorism programming. As always, facility security initiatives and hardening soft targets will undoubtedly remain important, but recent incidents and violent extremists' growing preference for targeted attacks against high-profile personnel suggest that executive protection is an increasingly crucial aspect of countering violent extremist threats to organizations. Organizations can mitigate threats to executives not only through reactive detection of online threats and negative sentiment campaigns, but also by proactively identifying and removing publicly available information that can be used to target personnel. Physical

security teams can query the Recorded Future Intelligence Cloud's extensive corpus of sources used by violent extremists to analyze intelligence pertaining to these and other violent extremist threats.

Key Findings

During the next twelve months:

- The US will very likely face a heightened threat from violent extremist physical threat activities due to the enduring influence of the Israel-Hamas conflict; geopolitical developments in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa favoring foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs); and the increasing ease of access to and use of new and developing technologies.
- While their preferred targets vary, most violent extremist threat actors are almost certainly interested in threatening US federal, state, and local governments. Critical infrastructure providers, defense contractors, and the education, insurance, healthcare, banking, finance, and maritime industry sectors also very likely face heightened risks.
- Islamic State (IS) supporters will very likely represent the most lethal HVE threat to the US, especially if IS experiences a resurgence in Syria following the 2024 fall of the al-Assad government.
- HVEs with a nexus to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, Iraqi Shi'a militias, or other "Axis of Resistance" groups are unlikely to carry out attacks in the US, but they likely have increased motivation to do so and access to expanded facilitative resources due to the US's direct involvement in the Iran-Israel conflict.
- The DVE groups that likely pose the largest threat of conducting violent attacks in the US, such as neo-Nazi accelerationists, anti-government/anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVEs) motivated by political animus, and anarchist violent extremists (AVEs), are likely to increasingly prefer targeted attacks and assassinations over mass-casualty attack plots.
- Militia violent extremists (MVEs), AVEs, and AGAAVEs harboring political grievances due to US domestic political issues will almost certainly physically threaten judges, public officials, business executives, and other high-profile public figures.

Background

Insikt Group's forecast is predicated on its assessments of open-source information on the activities of HVEs and DVEs in the US, including the Recorded Future Intelligence Cloud's extensive index of HVE and DVE communications on various online platforms. During the past twelve months, Insikt Group researchers curated several hundred HVE and DVE sources, adding them to an extensive index of preexisting sources of this type.

This report defines "homegrown violent extremist," "domestic violent extremist," and several categories of HVEs and DVEs based on the US Intelligence Community's [definitions and categorizations](#) of threat actors. Periodically, this report prefers definitions adopted by Insikt Group subject matter experts for analytic utility, or in instances where the US government has not officially defined a particular phenomenon or movement. A full list of terms and definitions used in this report is available in **Appendix A**.

Homegrown Violent Extremists

HVEs are very likely to carry out physical threat activities targeting US government and law enforcement installations and personnel, public events, large commercial spaces, houses of worship and religious communities, and counter-protestors and demonstrators. US-based IS supporters will very likely present the most lethal violent extremist threat to the US during the next twelve months, and the continued mobilization factor of the Israel-Hamas conflict will almost certainly [drive](#) some Americans to provide support for IS, al-Qaeda, and other FTOs (although organizations other than IS and al-Shabaab — al-Qaeda's Somalia franchise — very likely lack the infrastructure, personnel, and interest in recruiting US persons).

However, while sporadic escalations in the Israel-Hamas conflict will almost certainly [influence](#) disruptive protest activities and other physical threats in 2025, most visibly at US universities, threat actors will likely be deterred from overt displays of support for FTOs and plotting mass-casualty attacks due to the almost certain increase in law enforcement resources [dedicated](#) to investigating and prosecuting these threats. Instead, extant pro-Hamas networks in the US are very likely to [emphasize](#) covert operations, especially those that finance the organization.

In addition, the geopolitical climate likely [favors](#) efforts by IS and al-Qaeda affiliates in the Levant, Central Asia, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa to expand their territorial holdings, [conduct](#) increasingly sophisticated and lethal attacks in their areas of operations, and [develop](#) connections between their operatives and recruitment networks in Western Europe and North America.

Expanding commercial markets and ease of use of developing technologies — particularly UAVs and cryptocurrencies — are very likely to bolster HVE operations on behalf of a range of FTOs in 2025. US HVEs almost certainly continue to provide financial assistance to IS, al-Qaeda, and Hamas through cryptocurrencies. For example, Hamas has almost certainly [developed](#) a sophisticated network of

cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges it uses to [funnel](#) funds from its international supporters to its operatives in the Palestinian Territories. HVEs are very likely to continue [experimenting](#) with these new technologies for [applications](#) in attack plotting, particularly with UAV-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and 3D-printed firearms and weapons components.

Islamic State

The most persistent and lethal violent extremist threat to the US during the next twelve months will very likely come from IS supporters in the US who plan physical threat activities alone or in small groups, rely on minimal external direction from IS, and use less-sophisticated TTPs such as attacks with firearms, bladed weapons, and vehicular assaults. On New Year's Day 2025, for example, Shamsud Din Jabbar [carried out](#) the first lethal attack in the US connected to IS since 2017, [piloting](#) a pickup truck into a crowd in New Orleans, killing fourteen and wounding over 50. The attack followed a notable uptick in IS activity in the US; according to data from the George Washington University Program on Extremism, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) [arrested](#) nine IS sympathizers on federal charges in 2024, in comparison to six the year prior. These cases allegedly included major efforts by IS sympathizers to conduct mass-casualty attacks in the US, including an Oklahoma resident [arrested](#) in October 2024 for planning to attack an election facility on Election Day and a Canada resident [arrested](#) in September 2024 for planning to enter the US and carry out a mass shooting at a Jewish community center in New York City.

Insikt Group's June 2024 [assessment](#) that the IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) would become IS's global "standard-bearer for external operations and media production" was largely accurate. ISKP attack planners, functioning alongside IS logistic networks in Central Asia and Türkiye and Russian-, Uzbek-, and Tajik-speaking supporters in Europe, [carried out](#) several major terrorist attacks in 2024. Notably, these included the January 2024 suicide bombings in Kerman, Iran, that killed over 90, as well as the March 2024 mass shooting at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia, that resulted in hundreds of casualties, including 145 dead. Attack plots connected to the ISKP were also disrupted by security services in the US, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and other countries, including a thwarted effort by ISKP supporters residing in Austria to [attack](#) a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna in August 2024. These efforts followed a lengthy and almost certainly ongoing [campaign](#) spearheaded by the al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production — ISKP's media arm — to [encourage](#) supporters around the world to conduct attacks targeting sports stadiums, large concert halls, and major public events in the US and Europe.



Figure 1: September 5, 2024, graphic from al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production encouraging attacks in the United States
(Source: Recorded Future)

While US-based IS supporters have represented a persistent threat despite ebbs and flows in the organization's health overseas, ongoing geopolitical developments that are very likely [favorable](#) to IS will likely enhance its ability to inspire and direct plots in the US. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria, ongoing Turkish military operations in the north of the country, and a decrease in foreign assistance (through funds and military support) to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will very likely create [opportunities](#) for IS in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to exploit security vacuums and threaten areas in east and northeast Syria. The threat of an ISIS resurgence in 2025 would almost certainly be [exacerbated](#) by major terrorist attacks against the new Syrian government, or alternatively by a "prison break" operation to [free](#) captive ISIS fighters and supporters in the SDF-managed al-Hawl and al-Roj prison camps. In the immediate term, an ISIS resurgence would almost certainly provide a propaganda boost for the group's international supporters. In the medium term, it could create opportunities for ISIS to relaunch its external operations capabilities and target the US.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda very likely has a limited degree of support among American jihadist Salafi HVEs and is very unlikely to gain much more support due to the ongoing influence of its competitor, IS. In 2024, the US Intelligence Community assessed that al-Qaeda's central command had [reached](#) its "operational nadir." While some of the group's franchises enjoyed substantial success during the past twelve months, the strongest al-Qaeda franchises will likely remain [focused](#) on their areas of operation and are unlikely to devote significant resources to attacking the West in the short term. Nevertheless, the activities of specific al-Qaeda affiliates in 2024 and early 2025 portend an expanded threat to the US:

- In early 2025, Al-Shabaab [launched](#) a military operation in the Shabelle and Hiiraan regions of Somalia to recapture areas it held prior to a 2022 counterterrorism operation by the Somali Armed Forces. This ongoing operation will very likely [position](#) al-Shabaab to threaten the capital city, Mogadishu, as well as the Somali government's control over large swaths of the country. A revanchist al-Shabaab with significant territorial control in Somalia would almost certainly [threaten](#) US interests in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East; the group also likely has the means and intent to [threaten](#) the US homeland by externally guiding attack plots.
- In late 2023, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) [restarted](#) its English-language Inspire series, which provides directions and information for English speakers on conducting terrorist attacks in the West. A February 2024 video specifically [called](#) for HVEs in the US to conduct local attacks because of the US's support for Israel in its conflict against Hamas. In June 2025, a video message from AQAP leader Sa'ad bin Atef al-Awlaki [encouraged](#) HVEs to assassinate US political leaders, including President Trump and Vice President JD Vance.
- On May 29, 2025, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General Michael Langley [warned](#) that Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam w'al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda franchise in the Sahel that has gained a substantial territorial footprint in the region, "could have the capacity to attack the homeland." However, Insikt Group has not identified intelligence suggesting JNIM has displayed an interest in extraterritorial attack capabilities.

US-based IS and al-Qaeda supporters will almost certainly continue to use low-budget, low-sophistication, but lethal, [methods](#) of attack such as firearms, bladed weapons, and vehicular assaults, as well as retain their focus on targeting US government and law enforcement agencies, major public events, large commercial facilities, and targets associated with Jewish or Christian communities in the US. However, due to their increasing affordability, commercial availability, and ease of use, jihadist Salafi attack planners are also very likely to experiment with UAV and UAV-borne IEDs as attack TTPs. During 2024, jihadist Salafi propaganda frequently promoted the use of drones in conducting attacks, with some unofficial outlets providing guidance to supporters on how to operate them. A successful UAV-borne IED attack plot, whether in the US or overseas, would almost certainly [demonstrate](#) a proof of concept and supercharge jihadist Salafi HVEs' interest in UAVs.

Hamas

Mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the US with a nexus to Hamas or other Palestinian Territories-based FTOs (including Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ], the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], and others) remain very unlikely in the short term. These organizations have not demonstrated a capability or interest in conducting large-scale attacks in the US, although their ongoing conflict against Israel has almost certainly [inspired](#) US violent extremists without tangible ties to the organizations to conduct violence. Since Hamas's October 7, 2023, al-Aqsa Flood terrorist attack in Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have almost certainly [decimated](#) Hamas's leadership, particularly within the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the organization's military wing. Because of the element of inspiration, large-scale attack plots perpetrated by Hamas supporters in the US cannot be ruled out, although most violence with a direct link to the group is very likely to be small-scale and sporadic, and only occur at

protests or demonstrations where Hamas supporters confront counter-demonstrators or law enforcement.

While post-October 7 developments and Hamas's conflict with Israel continue to almost certainly [motivate](#) sympathies for Hamas among American violent extremists, the primary means of interaction between US Hamas supporters and the organization's command and control structure almost certainly continues to be through financing efforts. The group has almost certainly [created](#) a complex network of cryptocurrency donation portals, exchanges, and wallets, from which they have [generated](#) "tens of millions" of US dollars from foreign donors, including from the US. These networks have likely replaced the role of "brick-and-mortar" US-based charitable organizations that, for decades, have allegedly [provided](#) funds from US donors to Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, and other Palestinian FTOs.

Axis of Resistance

The US missile strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21 and 22, 2025, likely increased the risk of HVE and DVE supporters of Iran and its Axis of Resistance groups, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi Shi'a militias, and others, conducting physical threat activities on US soil, although these groups are still unlikely to carry out a mass-casualty terrorist attack in the US during the next twelve months. While Iran's military and intelligence agencies are likely to enhance their efforts to [recruit](#) assets in the US to carry out targeted attacks against US political figures and dissidents in the aftermath of the strikes, these efforts will very likely be constrained by US law enforcement investigations, the relative structural weakness of Axis of Resistance groups, and the almost certain disinterest of many US-based HVE and DVE groups in supporting Iran. Several factors during the next twelve months, including public incitement of attacks on US soil by Iranian officials or future US military activity against Iran, could [augment](#) these threats, although the most likely scenario is US HVEs and DVEs attempting to provide financial and material support to these groups on their own.

Iran's proxies have not publicly indicated their interest in recruiting or directing Americans to conduct attacks on their behalf in the US since October 7, 2023. However, Iran's military and intelligence agencies, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have almost certainly continued their efforts to [recruit](#) and [incite](#) overseas threat actors to [conduct](#) targeted attacks and assassinations against high-profile US politicians and Iranian dissidents on US soil. Iran's motivation to revitalize these efforts, several of which have been [identified](#) and [disrupted](#) by US law enforcement, likely increased in the immediate aftermath of US directly attacking Iran, although the subsequent ceasefire and cessation of US military activity in Iran will very likely decrease Iran's appetite for remotely guiding terror plots in the medium-to-long term, if the ceasefire holds. There is no evidence to suggest that the IRGC exclusively recruits ideologically motivated violent extremists for these efforts (many of their [assets](#) have been [participants](#) in criminal organizations who are financially solicited to conduct attacks), and Iran will very likely attempt to [exploit](#) threat actors in the US with common ideological causes to conduct attacks on their behalf.

Hezbollah's ability to conduct extraterritorial attacks outside of Lebanon was almost certainly diminished by the leadership losses the organization [suffered](#) during Israeli strikes in 2024, particularly

its secretaries general Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine and military leaders Fuad Shukr and Ibrahim Aqil. Notably, Aqil was a senior [member](#) of Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization, which has historically been [responsible](#) for planning external operations, including in the US. Ongoing Lebanese government efforts to demilitarize Hezbollah will likely further reduce the group's capabilities and interest in attacking the West. In 2024, there were sporadic instances of US HVEs attempting to [provide](#) material support for Hezbollah by joining the organization, although in these cases Hezbollah almost certainly indicated they were uninterested in taking on US or Western foreign fighters.


Likewise, the Houthis have not demonstrated the intent, capability, or interest in conducting terrorist attacks in the US, preferring to [target](#) commercial vessels in the Red Sea and, on occasion, Israel. On March 5, 2025, the US Department of State [redesignated](#) the Houthis as an FTO just before the [launch](#) of Operation Rough Rider, a US military campaign of airstrikes against the organization in Yemen. During the next twelve months, there are likely to be instances where US HVEs donate or otherwise provide material support to the Houthis. In this case, it would be unclear whether this trend would represent an increase in this activity, as the provision of material support to the Houthis was not illegal (and therefore not subject to prosecutions and investigations) in the US prior to their March 5, 2025, designation.

Domestic Violent Extremists

Several persistent trends in the DVE landscape during the past several years, as well as notable geopolitical events in late 2024 and 2025, have likely transformed the threat environment facing US public and private sector entities. In sum, these trends suggest the DVE groups most likely to conduct violence in the US, such as neo-Nazi accelerationists, AGAAVEs motivated by political or partisan animus, and AVEs, are likely to increasingly consider conducting targeted, limited-scope attacks against an expanding range of public and private sector personnel or key facilities, rather than conducting attacks intended to cause mass casualties.

- A range of DVEs representing competing ideological groups have celebrated the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of then-US presidential candidate Donald Trump; the December 4, 2024, assassination of United Healthcare chief executive officer (CEO) Brian Thompson and its alleged perpetrator, Luigi Mangione; the May 21, 2025, assassination of Embassy of Israel employees Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Milgrim in Washington, DC; and the June 14, 2025, targeted attacks against Minnesota state legislators Melissa Hortman and John Hoffman. Neo-Nazi and white supremacist DVEs, AGAAVEs, AVEs, and others will almost certainly continue to threaten or attempt to conduct targeted attacks against private and public sector executives during the next twelve months.
- Law enforcement operations during the past twelve months have very likely disrupted neo-Nazi accelerationist online networks that, although they very likely lacked an organized hierarchy or structure, influenced a significant amount of mass-casualty DVE attack plots over the past several years. While the ideas associated with these online networks will almost certainly persist, the arrests of prominent ideologues and influencers in these movements will likely reduce their capacity to direct and guide mass-casualty attack planners.

- Certain MVEs and AGAAVEs that planned to conduct physical threat activities during or after the 2024 US elections have very likely reduced their operational tempo due to the election results, which they almost certainly viewed favorably. However, some of these threat actors continue to threaten high-profile figures they believe are opposed to the current US presidential administration or its policies, particularly judges, state government executives, Democratic Party political officials, and law enforcement officials.
- AGAAVEs motivated by political animus against the current US presidential administration and AVEs have threatened and conducted physical attacks targeting individual members of the Trump administration, high-profile figures associated with the administration, and the administration's business interests.
- The Israel-Hamas conflict almost certainly continues to drive AVE efforts to select more damaging and lethal attack TTPs, including targeted physical attacks against high-profile personnel and destructive methods of conducting sabotage against facilities.



Figures 2 and 3: Propaganda from a neo-Nazi violent extremist (left) and AVE (right) channel glorifying Luigi Mangione (Source: Recorded Future)

White Supremacist and Neo-Nazi Violent Extremists

Neo-Nazi Accelerationists

While lone threat actors associated with the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement remain very likely to plan and attempt to conduct mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the US in 2025, the overall threat from these threat actors is likely decreasing due to significant law enforcement actions in 2024. On September 9, 2024, the DOJ [arrested](#) Dallas Humber and Matthew Allison, two alleged leaders of the international online neo-Nazi accelerationist network Terrorgram Collective, which the US subsequently

[listed](#) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on January 13, 2025. Humber and Allison were allegedly [responsible](#) for coordinating the publication and dissemination of content encouraging neo-Nazi accelerationists to conduct attacks against US critical infrastructure; federal buildings; politicians, law enforcement, and judicial officials; racial, ethnic, and religious minorities; and members of the LGBTQIA+ community. They also reportedly assisted individuals who, after contacting their online personas, [sought](#) ideological inspiration and tactical guidance for conducting attacks on critical infrastructure.

Following Humber and Allison's arrests and the Terrorgram Collective's US designation, Insikt Group observed a notable decline in the number of online sources connected to the Terrorgram Collective, particularly on Telegram, as well as reactions by other notable neo-Nazi accelerationist influencers discouraging their followers from conducting mass-casualty terrorist attacks and encouraging strict operational security (OPSEC) protocols. In the wake of the arrests and broader sociopolitical trends in the US, the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement is likely [prioritizing](#) the doctrine of "defensive accelerationism," as opposed to the "offensive accelerationism" of Terrorgram Collective and its predecessors.¹ While both hold the precept that the collapse of the US government and American society are inevitable, imminent, and beneficial to the neo-Nazi cause, offensive accelerationism promotes conducting terrorist attacks, mass-casualty violence, and the large-scale destruction of critical infrastructure as a means of hastening the collapse, whereas defensive accelerationism prefers forming paramilitary groups, training and preparing for future military actions, clandestine attacks against critical infrastructure, and laying the groundwork for a white supremacist takeover of society in a post-collapse environment.

A growing preference for defensive accelerationism among the movement's influencers would likely lessen the risk of neo-Nazi accelerationist mass-casualty attacks against commercial facilities, large events and gatherings, or houses of worship. Defensive accelerationists have derided the use of these TTPs for their perceived failure to foment systemic collapse and for sacrificing militants willing to conduct violent action for little strategic gain. However, neo-Nazi accelerationists adopting a defensive posture would very likely retain their focus on attacking critical infrastructure systems — particularly the electric grid, communications systems, and transportation infrastructure — albeit with an emphasis on conducting targeted, limited, and clandestine sabotage of infrastructure rather than large-scale attacks attempting to systematically destroy infrastructure systems. Defensive accelerationist sources continued to distribute information promoting or guiding targeted attacks on critical infrastructure systems during 2024.

Nevertheless, offensive accelerationism and historic publications promoting the doctrine will very likely continue to influence neo-Nazi, white supremacist, and other DVEs, as well as other violent threat actors, into planning mass-casualty attacks in 2025. Combined with influences from other online subcultures, the individuals who [conducted](#) the December 2024 and January 2025 mass shootings at schools in Madison, Wisconsin, and Antioch, Tennessee, respectively, [referenced](#) concepts and figures from the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement in their writings and manifestos. Neo-Nazi accelerationism

¹ Content referred to in this section reflects material from neo-Nazi accelerationist websites, social media profiles, and messaging platforms reviewed by Insikt Group.

will also very likely to continue to inspire violence through its [influence](#) on groups like Maniacs Murder Cult (Маньяки - Культ Убийства, also MMC or MKY), No Lives Matter (NLM), and 764, who have almost certainly appropriated terms, concepts, and ideological aspects from the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement to support their worldviews. In 2024 and early 2025, US law enforcement [arrested](#) several individuals allegedly [linked](#) to these groups, who it claimed plotted violent attacks in the US, including a February 2025 [plot](#) to assassinate US president Donald Trump.

Finally, although the predominant threat of violence from neo-Nazi accelerationists will very likely continue to emanate from lone threat actors and small cells, the transnational neo-Nazi network the Base is almost certainly attempting to become the leading organization within the movement. Since July 2024, the group has made multiple [overtures](#) to US-based neo-Nazi and white supremacist DVEs, encouraging them to join the organization's regional paramilitary cells in the US and engage in training exercises to prepare for the perceived collapse of the US government (**Figure 2**). The group's propaganda, which it [disseminates](#) through Telegram and SimpleX channels, a VKontakte page, and Russia-based video filesharing websites, has depicted the activities of its followers in the US in 2024 and 2025, and almost certainly attempts to frame the group as the sole neo-Nazi DVE group with the legitimacy and capability to achieve the movement's strategic goals. Internal controversy over the [allegiances](#) of the group's leader, Rinaldo Nazzaro, will very likely limit the Base's attempts to consolidate support among US DVEs, although the almost certain lack of a competitor organization in the US will likely aid the group's recruitment efforts.



Figure 4: Members of the Base engage in paramilitary training in the US in January 2025 (Source: Recorded Future)

Active Clubs

White supremacist active clubs, involving local groups of white supremacist DVEs who train in hand-to-hand combat to violently confront ideological opponents at protests and rallies, are almost certainly [present](#) in nearly all 50 US states. The largest active club network in the US is Patriot Front, which [manages](#) regional chapters throughout the US. Most active club protests have been [hostile](#) but nonviolent; the presence of counter-protestors (particularly AVE counter-protestors) heightens the risk of escalation and violent confrontation.

The active club movement in the US expanded in two directions during 2024 and early 2025, which likely portends changes in the groups' trajectories. First, in March 2025, various Telegram channels [announced](#) the formation of United Youth, an umbrella organization for several "youth active clubs" serving sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds throughout the US. The establishment of youth active clubs have very likely [created](#) a vector for younger participants to join formations in the white supremacist movement, likely expanding active clubs' recruitment bases and leading to an influx of younger members that may be more prone to violence. Furthermore, US-based active clubs continued to develop connections with a rapidly expanding [network](#) of international active clubs in Western and Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South America. In certain instances, transnational linkages between active clubs will likely [increase](#) the degree to which US-based DVEs are involved in overseas activities that, while possibly lawful in the US, may run afoul of other countries' laws against promoting hate or sanctions against domestic organizations.

Other White Supremacist and Neo-Nazi Violent Extremists

Unaffiliated white supremacist and neo-Nazi DVEs will very likely continue to issue online threats of violence to racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, senior US government officials, private sector executives, commercial facilities, educational institutions, and non-governmental organizations during the next twelve months. On April 17, 2025, a white supremacist violent extremist [opened fire](#) on Florida State University's campus in Tallahassee, Florida, killing two and wounding six. The alleged perpetrator, Phoenix Ikner, reportedly [expressed](#) neo-Nazi and white supremacist viewpoints that caused him to be expelled from a campus political group, and he displayed neo-Nazi and white supremacist iconography on several online accounts.

Additionally, these threat actors are very likely to conduct doxing and swatting to target their opponents. In 2024 and early 2025, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) released several public [warnings](#) indicating that threat actors — almost certainly including white supremacist and neo-Nazi DVEs — were [targeting](#) "high-profile public figures, as well as schools, hospitals, places of worship, and centers of mass transportation" with swatting, accessing data necessary for the attack by "[compiling] sensitive information from a wide range of publicly available sources, including online accounts, to develop invasive profiles of their targets."

Notably, in April 2025, a likely white supremacist DVE threat actor who Insikt Group assesses is one of the highest-credibility doxing threat actors returned to action following a five-year hiatus, very likely

increasing the risk of future white supremacist doxing activity targeting high-profile public figures.² Between 2018 and 2020, the threat actor doxed over 60 high-profile public figures and members of their families. After their return in April 2025, the threat actor doxed several senior public and private sector executives, including two sitting US Cabinet secretaries, CEOs of defense contractors and pharmaceutical companies, and a high-profile former government executive, alongside their families. The threat actor's doxes claim to include a significant level of personally identifiable information (PII) about their victims, such as Social Security numbers, which likely demonstrates their proficiency with open-source intelligence methods threat actors use to obtain PII for doxing attempts.

Militia and Anti-Government Violent Extremists

In the short term, the results of the 2024 US presidential election likely decreased the risk of physical threats from most MVE organizations and some AGAAVE groups motivated by political animus against the Democratic Party, as these threat actors almost certainly favored the presidential candidate who won the election. Nevertheless, in the six months since the election and the four months since the presidential inauguration, several scenarios have become flashpoints for physical threat activities involving individual DVEs associated with these groups. The frequency of these scenarios is very likely to increase during the next twelve months, auguring a likely increased frequency of MVE and AGAAVE violence. Specifically:

- MVEs and AGAAVEs motivated by political animus against the Democratic Party will almost certainly threaten, dox, and conduct swatting attempts and targeted attacks against public officials, especially legislators, judges, and judicial officials, who are perceived to be impeding the efforts of the current administration to enforce its policy priorities.
- MVEs and AGAAVEs who perceive the administration is inadequately enforcing certain policy priorities, particularly regarding immigration enforcement, law enforcement efforts against former administration officials, and punitive measures against healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, are likely to adopt vigilantism as a practice and conduct physical threat activities against individuals and organizations associated with these efforts.

Violence committed by AGAAVEs motivated by political animus against the President and the current administration has very likely escalated since 2024 and represents a persistent threat to officials, agencies, and high-profile public figures associated with the administration. During the 2024 election cycle, there were two assassination [attempts](#) against then-presidential candidate Trump, one of which was very likely [perpetrated](#) by an individual opposed to Trump and his policies.³ In 2025, AGAAVEs, alongside AVEs, [conducted](#) a sabotage and firebombing campaign against Tesla dealerships, almost certainly to protest the role of its CEO, Elon Musk, in the Trump administration.

² Content referred to in this paragraph reflects material reviewed by Insikt Group on a website popular among doxing threat actors.

³ In the FBI's last public update on the case on August 28, 2024, FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge Thomas Rojek [stated](#) that Thomas Matthew Crooks, the perpetrator of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt against Donald Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania exhibited "a mixture of ideologies," and claimed Crooks's motivation was "something that we're still attempting to analyze and draw conclusions on." Insikt Group has not classified Crooks under any specific DVE subcategory.

Militia Violent Extremists

MVEs will almost certainly threaten physical violence against government agencies and facilities and will very likely mobilize during the next twelve months in support of what they perceive as gaps in the US government's enforcement of its policy priorities. The US militia movement's end strength almost certainly [draws](#) on decentralized networks of MVEs throughout the country who occasionally form local and regional cells and militias, as opposed to nationwide organizations. Notably, several leaders of the Oath Keepers — almost certainly the most prominent nationwide MVE group prior to 2021 — had their federal prison sentences [commuted](#) in early 2025 and were released after serving time for their [roles](#) in the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol building. In the short term, pardons and commutations of MVE leaders are unlikely to lead to significant increases in physical threat activities conducted by their organizations. However, in the medium-to-long term, they are almost certain to be [interpreted](#) by MVEs as official approval of political violence, and, if major changes in the US political environment occur (such as a shift in power during the 2026 congressional midterm elections, major gun control initiatives by state and local governments, or significant judicial rulings limiting presidential authority), nationwide MVE organizations would very likely be well-positioned to resume recruitment and mobilization efforts.

A significant percentage of individual MVEs and small MVE groups in the US very likely perceive themselves as auxiliary forces [dedicated](#) to carrying out the perceived policy priorities of the current US government, especially in [situations](#) where they believe current levels of US government action (including those related to immigration enforcement) are either inadequate or unjustly restricted by congressional, judicial, or state and local authorities. Historically, MVEs active in states on the US-Mexico border have [attempted](#) to act as vigilante border police and have recruited MVEs from other US states to travel to the border to conduct unauthorized immigration enforcement operations. MVEs will likely [engage](#) in these activities not only on the border, but also in areas of the US with real or perceived heightened levels of illegal immigration or "sanctuary cities," putting not only civilians at risk of physical threats but also jeopardizing US law enforcement's efforts to conduct lawful immigration enforcement operations.

MVEs have also been frequently involved in disseminating malign influence narratives targeting various US government agencies and private sector organizations during the last twelve months, which they use to mobilize their followers and threaten their targets with physical violence. These activities are especially likely to occur following natural disasters in the US, which MVEs [leverage](#) to spread theories [accusing](#) the US government of intentionally causing the natural disasters, deliberately withholding disaster relief efforts from certain areas, or using the devastation as a pretext to seize land from the previous landowners. Following the disasters, MVE groups also [deployed](#) to disaster zones to provide relief, recruit new adherents, and prepare for standoffs with federal government authorities. These efforts, which were especially [prominent](#) in the wake of Hurricane Helene in September 2024 and the Los Angeles-area wildfires in January 2025, very likely [risk](#) armed confrontations between MVEs and emergency management agencies, as well as create informational hazards for the public in disaster zones.



Figure 5: Sign posted by the MVE group Veterans on Patrol announcing its intent to target a Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) facility in Oklahoma, May 9, 2025 (Source: Recorded Future)

Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Violent Extremists

AGAAVEs motivated by political animus, regardless of whether or not they support the current US presidential administration or its policies, are almost certain to issue threats to public officials and are very likely to conduct targeted attacks against the same officials. According to data from the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE), the number of federal cases involving threats to public officials in the US has steadily [increased](#) over the past decade; the frequency of cases [reached](#) record highs in both 2023 and 2024, and this trend is very likely to continue in 2025. AGAAVEs motivated by political animus will almost certainly continue threatening judges, state and local officials, members of Congress, administration officials, government agencies, or high-profile public figures, with individual AGAAVEs' exact targets dependent on their political alignment.

In 2024 and early 2025, government officials were targeted with online threats, doxing attempts, and swatting campaigns following major legal decisions pertaining to President Trump or his administration. Prior to the 2024 elections, AGAAVEs frequently [threatened](#) members of Congress, judges, and state government officials; following the elections, judges and state law enforcement officials have almost certainly [faced](#) the brunt of AGAAVE physical threat activity. Data from the US Marshals Service [shows](#) that between January 1 and April 14, 2025, alone, over 240 judges throughout the US received threats. The frequency of these incidents almost certainly [increased](#) after decisions by US courts to rule against the presidential administration.

AGAAVE physical threat activities have occasionally escalated into attempts to attack or kill public officials. For example, on June 14, 2025, Vance Boelter allegedly [conducted](#) a series of attempted

assassinations against Minnesota and other legislators, killing state representative Melissa Hortman and her husband and wounding state senator John Hoffman and his wife. Federal authorities [claim](#) Boelter had written a “hit list” of over 70 individuals he intended to attack, mostly Democratic Party legislators and high-profile political figures. On April 13, 2025, a lone threat actor [threw](#) incendiary devices at the residence of Pennsylvania governor Josh Shapiro, setting a significant portion of the property on fire while the governor and his family were physically present.

AGAAVEs opposed to the current presidential administration have also engaged in online threats. In the last twelve months, federal law enforcement has arrested several individuals who allegedly [threatened](#) to assassinate President Trump, the heads of federal government agencies, or individuals associated with the presidential administration. On September 15, 2024, the Secret Service [disrupted](#) what was reportedly an active attempt to assassinate then-presidential candidate Trump at Trump International Golf Club in Palm Beach, Florida. The alleged would-be assassin reportedly [authored](#) a letter stating that his opposition to the candidate’s policies was the motivation for the attack plot. On May 8, 2025, a Massachusetts resident [surrendered](#) to the US Capitol Police after allegedly planning to assassinate then-Secretary of the Treasury nominee Scott Bessent using a Molotov cocktail. Individual AGAAVEs opposed to the administration, alongside AVEs, also almost certainly took part in a [campaign](#) of violent attacks, sabotage, and property destruction and defacement against Tesla dealerships in early 2025, motivated by the role of Tesla CEO Elon Musk in the Trump administration.

Anarchist Violent Extremists

Conflicts in the Middle East involving Israel almost certainly continue to foment escalation in the lethality and frequency of AVE physical threats. While other issues, chief among them opposition to immigration enforcement operations and the immigration policies of the Trump administration, have also almost certainly increased the frequency of AVE activity during the past twelve months, AVEs’ reactions to the conflict and its second-order effects on US domestic political dynamics have almost certainly influenced AVEs to adopt more destructive TTPs targeting private sector property and, in limited cases, lethal attacks on personnel. AVEs will almost certainly continue [promoting](#) the [causes](#) of alleged assassins Luigi Mangione and Elias Rodriguez, as AVE threat actors almost certainly perceive these individuals and their actions as congruent to or aligned with their causes. Their glorification of targeted attacks against high-profile public figures will almost certainly motivate AVE physical threat activities focused on individuals in the future.

Similar to other DVE categories, the bulk of AVE violence in the US is almost certainly [conducted](#) by lone threat actors or small groups of AVEs in metropolitan or regional areas who often report or claim responsibility for their actions in regional or national anarchist counter-information websites. In addition to claims of responsibility and communiqués from AVE cells, these websites publish propaganda encouraging attacks on private and public sector entities and instructional material for conducting attacks, as well as occasionally [disseminate](#) or redistribute doxes of preferred targets for attacks. In 2024 and early 2025, a counter-information website managed by the AVE group Unity of Fields (initially formed as the US branch of the UK DVE group Palestine Action) has [become](#) the anarchist

counter-information website that most frequently posts content inciting or encouraging violent activity in the US.

Since October 7, 2023, Unity of Fields and other US-based AVE groups have been calling for participants in the movement to escalate their tactics for opposing Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip and the real or perceived relationships between US entities and the Israeli military.⁴ These risks are compounded by AVEs' perception that non-violent direct action methods, such as peaceful protests or political advocacy, have not significantly affected changes in the Israel-Hamas conflict. To this end, during the past twelve months, AVEs have increasingly encouraged their followers to conduct sabotage, disruptive demonstrations, doxing, and targeted physical threats against individuals and organizations in the US they believe are providing support to Israel. A very likely sign that AVEs are encouraging more destructive TTPs is the increased frequency of instructions on counter-information sites detailing how to construct IEDs and incendiary devices, particularly during the last six months. AVEs have physically threatened US private sector entities in numerous industry sectors during the past twelve months but have been especially likely to target the facilities and personnel of defense contractors and arms manufacturing, insurance, healthcare, banking, finance, and international shipping companies.



Figure 6: Front page of Elias Rodriguez's alleged manifesto, formatted into a leaflet by Unity of Fields on May 22, 2025
(Source: Unity of Fields)

Between January and April 2025, AVEs also almost certainly participated in, encouraged, and provided guidance and instructional material to individuals conducting physical threat activities during large-scale protest movements in the US. AVEs and counter-information websites have likely played

⁴Content referred to in this section reflects material from AVE websites, social media profiles, and messaging platforms reviewed by Insikt Group.

roles in [coordinating](#) unlawful protests on university campuses during the past year, as well as during recent anti-immigration enforcement [protests](#) in cities throughout the US. For instance, citing the recent June 2025 protests in Los Angeles as a motivation, a self-identified anarchist in New York City used homemade incendiary devices to [burn](#) at least eleven New York Police Department vehicles on June 12, 2025, and claimed responsibility for the action in a communique. The continued salience of the Israel-Hamas conflict and an ongoing expansion of immigration enforcement efforts (and concomitant protests) in the US will almost certainly continue to drive AVE attacks.

Other Domestic Violent Extremists

Some individual DVE threat actors in the US will almost certainly continue [drawing](#) from syncretic mixes of ideological influences and DVE movements to create unique, personalized ideologies that inform their worldview. There will also almost certainly be instances of collaboration and convergence between DVE movements during the next twelve months, particularly between pro-Hamas HVEs, AGAAVEs motivated by political animus against the current presidential administration, and AVEs on issues related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Finally, physical threat actors who are not ideologically motivated violent extremists — such as transnational criminal organizations, perpetrators of mass shootings and other mass-casualty attacks, and networks engaging in online harms — at times appropriate concepts or symbology from violent extremists, despite lacking a clear ideological motivation for their actions.

A physical threat actor typology that straddles the definitional boundaries of violent extremism are groups that the DOJ and some counterterrorism analysts have termed “nihilistic violent extremists” (NVE), [defined](#) in one source as “individuals who engage in criminal conduct within the United States and abroad, in furtherance of political, social, or religious goals that derive primarily from a hatred of society at large and a desire to bring about its collapse by sowing indiscriminate chaos, destruction, and social instability.”⁵ During 2025, the DOJ [defined](#) a number of different threat actors as NVEs — including participants in the transnational online sextortion and child sexual abuse material (CSAM) network 764, adherents of the neo-Nazi Satanist ideology Order of Nine Angles (O9A), and the alleged perpetrator of a May 17, 2025, bombing at a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, California. The FBI has [warned](#) that threat actors connected to these groups pose an increased risk of plotting violent attacks and engaging in other harmful criminal behavior, including sextortion, CSAM production, swatting, and doxing.

⁵ Insikt Group does not use the term “nihilistic violent extremism” or the corresponding definition above in order to ensure analytical precision in assessing the ideological motivations of violent extremist groups. The definition provided above is vague; violent extremist threat actors may have “a hatred of society at large and a desire to bring about its collapse by sowing indiscriminate chaos, destruction, and social instability” but are better characterized using other labels that may more closely capture their ideological beliefs. For instance, O9A and other groups, such as MMC and NLM, express clear neo-Nazi accelerationist beliefs as motivating factors in their ideological material. Moreover, several of the groups that federal authorities or counterterrorism analysts have characterized as NVEs are not nihilists (insofar as they do not believe existence is useless or that life has no meaning), are not violent extremists, or are neither nihilists or violent extremists. Per the definition of “domestic violent extremism” in **Appendix A**, which is also in use within the US Intelligence Community, many participants in a group like 764 cannot be considered violent extremists insofar as their illicit activities are not intended to fulfil a political or social goal.

Outlook

Insikt Group assesses that targeted attacks that are not intended to cause mass casualties, like the assassinations and assassination attempts, doxing and swatting campaigns, and sabotages and arsons of facilities that occurred throughout 2024 and early 2025, are the predominant violent extremist threats facing most public and private sector entities in the US. Compared to mass-casualty attacks, targeted violent extremist attacks occur more frequently, are less likely to be disrupted by law enforcement and, despite their lessened lethality, can nevertheless cause substantial damage to the targeted organizations. Entities that are likely targets for violent extremists, particularly for DVEs, should increasingly prioritize executive protection as a core aspect of their physical risk mitigation efforts.

Overall, the US almost certainly faces a heightened threat environment from violent extremists of multivalent ideological persuasions. During the next twelve months, threat levels will likely be further exacerbated by geopolitical developments and polarizing domestic political issues. The ongoing conflicts involving Israel, geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia, and US government policymaking on salient political issues will almost certainly contribute to violent extremists' ability to radicalize and recruit an expanding segment of the US population. Strategically, violent extremists — particularly DVEs — have almost certainly noted the degree of public support in the US for acts of political violence, particularly targeted attacks against high-profile public figures, and have promoted similar acts as a means of finding common ground with a broader sector of the public. Meanwhile, US law enforcement and homeland security agencies are [contending](#) with an ever-expanding range of strategic priorities, which has led to the [re-allocation](#) of staff, resources, and [programming](#) from domestic counterterrorism units to other law enforcement priorities, most notably immigration enforcement.

The threat of large-scale or mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by US-based violent extremists has not abated. The threat actors most likely to carry out an attack of this type in the US are HVE supporters of IS, very likely the only FTO that maintains the capability to inspire or direct its followers in the US to carry out lethal assaults. Following several disrupted plots involving IS supporters in late 2024, 2025 began with an attack in New Orleans perpetrated by an IS supporter that killed fourteen people, the first IS-linked lethal attack in the US since 2017 and the deadliest since the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida. Additionally, individual neo-Nazi and white supremacist violent extremists remain very likely to plot mass-casualty attacks, but the risk of these attacks has likely reduced over the last twelve months due to law enforcement activity and resultant shifts in the movement's online networks.

Moreover, the trends described above very likely place entities in the private sector and in state, local, tribal, and territorial governments at disproportionate risk from violent extremist physical threat activities, particularly from DVEs. The DVE threat actors most likely to conduct violent attacks in the US, such as neo-Nazi accelerationists, AGAAVEs motivated by political or partisan animus, and AVEs, are increasingly likely to target individual, high-profile public figures for physical and virtual threats rather than attempt large-scale or mass-casualty attacks. State and local government officials, as well as private sector executives, often [lack](#) the same executive protection resources as their federal

counterparts and may have broader digital footprints that can provide attackers with critical targeting information. Successful targeted attacks on these individuals can also cause significant impacts to the operations of the entities they manage, including losses of [shareholder confidence](#), [psychological effects](#) on other executives and employees, and major [reputational damage](#).

Beyond physical measures such as bodyguards and facilities security, organizations can mitigate risks from targeted HVE and DVE attacks through threat intelligence, which can enable executive protection and physical security teams to monitor ongoing threats, reduce access to open-source information that can be used to target an executive, and develop effective OPSEC regimes for personnel.

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Except where otherwise noted, Recorded Future's definitions and categories of violent extremism are adapted from US Intelligence Community documents, including:

- ["Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021,"](#) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 1, 2021
- ["US Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators,"](#) National Counterterrorism Center, 2021 edition
- ["Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,"](#) Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, October 2022

Homegrown violent extremist (HVE): "an individual who advocates, engages in, or is preparing to engage in or support terrorist activities in furtherance of a foreign terrorist organization's objectives, but who is acting independently of foreign terrorist direction."

Jihadist Salafis: HVEs who believe in the use of violence or armed force to achieve the fundamental goals and objectives of the Salafi movement: most importantly, the restoration of the Islamic religion to its practice during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers, the rejection of perceived alternative or aberrant practices of the religion, and the reestablishment of Islamic systems of governance.⁶

Domestic violent extremist (DVE): "an individual based and operating primarily in the United States without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power and who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. This assessment does not evaluate the actions of individuals engaged solely in activities protected by the First Amendment or other rights secured by the Constitution of the United States."

White supremacist violent extremist: DVEs with "ideological agendas derived from bias ... related to race or ethnicity," who "believe in the superiority of the white race."

Neo-Nazi violent extremist: DVEs with "ideological agendas derived from bias ... related to race or ethnicity," who "believe in the superiority of the white race" and promote the actions, ideology, governance model, leaders, or propaganda of Nazism or seek to establish a Nazi-inspired governing structure in the US.⁷

Neo-Nazi accelerationist: Neo-Nazi violent extremists who believe that terrorist violence is necessary to hasten the destruction of Western civilization and its replacement with white supremacist societies.⁸

⁶ Insikt Group definition, adapted from Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁷ Insikt Group definition, adapted from Arie Perliger, "Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America's Violent Far-Right," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 2012.

⁸ Insikt Group definition, adapted from Alex Newhouse, "The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism," *CTS Sentinel* 14:5 (June 2021).

White supremacist active club: A group of white supremacist DVEs who train in hand-to-hand combat and other activities to violently confront ideological opponents.⁹

Anti-government/anti-authority violent extremist (AGAAVE): DVEs “with ideological agendas derived from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies; or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy.”

Militia violent extremist (MVE): DVEs “who take overt steps to violently resist or facilitate the overthrow of the US government in support of their belief that the US government is purposely exceeding its Constitutional authority and is trying to establish a totalitarian regime” and may “oppose many federal and state laws and regulations, particularly those related to firearms ownership.”

Anarchist violent extremist (AVE): DVEs “who oppose all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions, which are perceived as harmful to society.”

⁹ Insikt Group definition, adapted from Ciarán O'Connor et al., “Active Clubs: The Growing Threat of ‘White Nationalism 3.0’ Across the United States,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue Insight Brief*, October 24, 2023.

Recorded Future reporting contains expressions of likelihood or probability consistent with US Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203: Analytic Standards (published January 2, 2015). Recorded Future reporting also uses confidence level standards employed by the US Intelligence Community to assess the quality and quantity of the source information supporting our analytic judgments.

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