



# Israel-Hamas Conflict, US Elections Drive Violent Extremist Threats in 2024

The Israel-Hamas conflict, the 2024 United States elections, and violent extremist content online are very likely to galvanize physical threats from violent extremists in 2024.

Threats from homegrown violent extremists will likely metastasize in 2024 — driven by the Israel-Hamas conflict and the broadening external operations capabilities of the Islamic State.

White supremacist violent extremists are the likeliest domestic violent extremists to conduct violent attacks, but threats from anti-government and anarchist extremists are also expected to increase.

## Executive Summary

The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, the upcoming 2024 United States (US) presidential election, and the broadening reach of violent extremist content online are very likely to galvanize homegrown violent extremist (HVE) and domestic violent extremist (DVE) threat actors into conducting physical threat activities throughout 2024. A significant escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict in 2024 or high degrees of contestation during the 2024 US election cycle would almost certainly augment the frequency of HVE and DVE physical threat activities in the US. Moreover, the frequency and sophistication of HVE attacks perpetrated by followers of the Islamic State (IS) is likely to increase, due to the resurgent external operations capabilities of its branch in Afghanistan, IS Khorasan Province (ISKP).

In a continuation of year-to-year trends, HVEs and DVEs in the US are almost certain to conduct physical threat activities, including violent attacks, threats, sabotage, harassment, stalking, disruptive demonstrations, surveillance, physical approaches, doxing, and swatting, in 2024. HVEs and DVEs are also very likely to plan and attempt to conduct mass-casualty attacks on US soil, although these plots are more likely than other physical threats to be thwarted by law enforcement. Facilities and personnel associated with racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and the LGBTQIA+ community, the US federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments (particularly law enforcement, criminal justice, and election agencies and their officials), and US critical infrastructure are at heightened risk from HVE and DVE physical threat activities in 2024.

HVE and DVE physical threat activities will very likely be carried out by lone actors or small cells of violent extremists in 2024. In 2022 and 2023, law enforcement operations against several nationwide DVE organizations significantly disrupted their capacity to conduct sophisticated physical threat activities. Nevertheless, Insikt Group did not observe any indications in 2023 of declining support for HVE or DVE ideologies, nor a decrease in the overall frequency or lethality of physical threat activities. As a result, low-sophistication attacks involving lone actors are very likely to remain a significant threat to lives, facilities, and business operations in 2024. These tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are also likely to cause serious operational, financial, reputational, and psychological harm to organizations and their personnel. Moreover, lone actor, low-sophistication terrorist attack plots are difficult for law enforcement to intercept and do not require perpetrators to possess significant knowledge, skills, abilities, or networked connections, or to acquire hard-to-find, illegal, or expensive materials.

The lone actor and small group operational model employed by most HVE and DVE threat actors, the wide array of HVE and DVE threats, and convergences and overlaps between HVE and DVE ideological categories likely make physical threat activities more difficult to anticipate and prevent. Nevertheless, public and private sector organizations that may be targeted by HVEs or DVEs can monitor violent extremists' online communications for references to their organization, personnel, or industry sector, as well as violent extremists' reactions to ongoing domestic political or geopolitical events and their promotion of specific TTPs for physical threat activities. These data points can help inform changes to an organization's physical security posture, particularly if there is a significant amount of online negative



sentiment directed toward an organization in HVE and DVE online sources — a likely sign that the organization will be targeted for physical threat activities.

## Key Findings

- HVEs — especially American IS supporters — are very likely to threaten US government and law enforcement personnel and facilities, public events, large commercial facilities, and US religious communities in 2024.
- In the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict, HVE supporters of Hamas and other foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) based in the Palestinian Territories are almost certain to continue financing Hamas and other Palestine-based FTOs— particularly through cryptocurrencies — participating in disruptive protests and demonstrations and engaging in sporadic violence at demonstrations. They are very unlikely, however, to plan or conduct a mass-casualty attack in the US in 2024.
- US-based Hezbollah supporters are almost certain to continue fundraising for the organization but are very unlikely to plan or conduct terrorist attacks in the US — unless the current Israel-Hamas conflict expands to a war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2024.
- DVEs who ascribe to the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement are very likely to plan and attempt to carry out mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the US in 2024, given data from previous years and ongoing trends.
- There will very likely be incidents in 2024 where militia violent extremists (MVEs) and anti-government/anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAs) motivated by partisan animus conduct physical threat activities against US election, judicial, and law enforcement officials, especially if the 2024 US election cycle is highly contested or if there are unfavorable results in ongoing court cases involving candidates for public office.
- Driven by the Israel-Hamas conflict and disputes over the construction of police facilities and fossil fuel pipelines, physical threat incidents involving anarchist violent extremists (AVEs) are likely to increase in 2024.

## Background

Insikt Group's forecast is predicated on its assessments of open-source information on the activities of HVEs and DVEs in the US, including the Recorded Future Intelligence Cloud's extensive collection of HVE and DVE communications on various online platforms. During 2023 alone, Insikt Group researchers curated several hundred HVE and DVE sources, adding them to an extensive collection of preexisting sources of this type.

This report defines “homegrown violent extremist”, “domestic violent extremist”, and several categories of HVEs and DVEs based on the US Intelligence Community's [definitions and categorizations](#) of threat actors. Periodically, this report prefers definitions adopted by Insikt Group subject matter experts. A full list of terms and definitions used in this report is available in **Appendix A**.

## Homegrown Violent Extremists

In 2024, HVEs are very likely to carry out physical threat activities against US government and law enforcement installations and personnel, public events, large commercial spaces, houses of worship and religious communities, and counter-protestors and demonstrators. For the past several years, US-based IS supporters, and to a lesser degree, al-Qaeda affiliates, have presented the most [lethal and frequent](#) HVE threats to the US; we expect this trend to continue in 2024. Due to the motivating factor of the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the broadening of ISKP's interest in and ability to manage attacks outside of its immediate area of operations, the HVE threat to the US will likely metastasize in 2024, reaching a level unseen since at least 2019 when IS lost the last vestiges of its territory in Syria and Iraq. Other HVEs — such as US-based supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah — will almost certainly continue fundraising, organizing protests and demonstrations, and on a much smaller scale, engaging in violence.

## Islamic State and al-Qaeda

IS supporters will very likely continue to represent the most lethal HVE threat to the US in 2024, and will very likely plan and attempt to conduct mass-casualty terrorist attacks. While there were no successful jihadist attack plots in 2023, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) arrested at least six IS or al-Qaeda sympathizers on federal charges, including two who allegedly planned to conduct attacks on US soil. However, multiple developments at the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024 likely portend an augmented threat from HVEs — and especially from IS supporters — during the remainder of the year. Hamas's October 7, 2023, terrorist attack against Israel and the Israeli military response very likely provide opportunities for jihadist groups to recruit and mobilize their American base of supporters. In addition, the March 22, 2024, terrorist attack at the Crocus City concert venue in Moscow, Russia — which US intelligence [assesses](#) was perpetrated by ISKP — demonstrates IS's resurgent external operations [capabilities](#), which are likely to augment the frequency and lethality of IS-related attack plots in the US in the near to medium term.

In 2024, IS franchises in Africa are very likely to [expand](#) their territorial holdings, while ISKP will very likely become the [standard-bearer](#) for external operations and media production. Aided by IS's global network of supporters, ISKP and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, IS's branch in the Levant), continue to [produce](#) a steady stream of English-language jihadist propaganda and disseminate it online through a variety of media. In conjunction with successful attacks with a nexus to ISKP, the branch in Afghanistan's media products will likely [solidify](#) its reputation among Western jihadists, including Americans, and direct potential sympathizers to ISKP. As foreign terrorist travel to Afghanistan [remains](#) logistically difficult for Americans, American IS supporters will almost certainly seek to assist the group through means of material support that allows them to remain in the US — including providing [financial support](#), assistance in the [production and translation](#) of media, and [conducting attacks](#) on behalf of the group in the US. ISKP is additionally likely to leverage [connections](#) between its Russian-, Uzbek-, and Tajik-speaking members overseas and supporters in the US to conduct externally guided fundraising and attack operations.

In contrast, al-Qaeda is very unlikely to regain the support it once enjoyed in the American jihadist milieu in 2024. Al-Qaeda could likely [develop](#) an external operations capability that could strike US targets, but the [majority](#) of American jihadists are almost certainly IS supporters, limiting al-Qaeda's ability to radicalize and recruit American HVEs. While the organization and its global franchises achieved significant operational [successes](#) in 2023 — particularly in West Africa, Yemen, and South Asia — al-Qaeda is very likely to continue consolidating local campaigns in 2024 and is unlikely to make substantial overtures to Westerners or plot attacks in the US. The last al-Qaeda external operation on US soil took place in 2019, when a Saudi aviation student reportedly directed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) conducted a [shooting](#) at Naval Air Station Pensacola (in Florida), killing three.

US-based IS and al-Qaeda supporters are almost certain to rely on their standard TTPs in 2024. For attacks, lone IS and al-Qaeda supporters and small cells will almost certainly continue to utilize low-budget, low-sophistication, but lethal [methods](#) of attack such as firearms, bladed weapons, and vehicular assaults. They are also very likely to consider conducting attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), although we judge a very small number of US HVEs have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully construct and conduct an attack using an IED. The very likely targets of these attacks are US government and law enforcement personnel and facilities, major public events and large commercial facilities, and targets associated with Jewish or Christian communities in the US.

Furthermore, HVEs are also very likely to attempt to [finance](#) IS, al-Qaeda, and their regional affiliates, and are increasingly likely to facilitate payments using cryptocurrencies. Finally, American adherents of jihadist Salafism<sup>1</sup> will almost certainly continue to play significant roles in jihadist online networks and communities, particularly with regard to [translating and producing](#) English-language jihadist content in support of transnational jihadist groups.

## Hamas

Hamas's al-Aqsa Flood terrorist attack and ongoing conflict with Israel almost certainly reinvigorated support networks for the organization across the US in late 2023. Throughout 2024, HVE supporters of Hamas and other Palestinian FTOs (including Palestinian Islamic Jihad/PIJ, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/PFLP, and others) are almost certain to provide material support for their preferred organization, as well as assist in organizing protests and events in the US. The involvement of HVEs in protests related to the Israel-Hamas conflict in 2024 is likely to [lead](#) to sporadic acts of violence between protestors and counter-protestors or law enforcement. While Hamas and other groups have [encouraged](#) their supporters in the US to provide support to their organizations and act on their behalf, they have not directly called for attacks; pro-Hamas HVEs are nevertheless likely to take the [initiative](#) to conduct violence in the US, although mass-casualty terrorist attacks with a nexus to Hamas in the US are very unlikely in 2024.

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<sup>1</sup> Defined in Appendix A.

For over 30 years, Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, and other Palestinian FTOs have [maintained](#) dedicated support networks in the US. Large-scale, US-based charities that allegedly provided funds for Hamas — such as those run by the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and KindHearts for Charitable Human Development — were [dismantled](#) by DOJ prosecutions and US Department of the Treasury [designations](#) in the mid-2000s. Since that time, support networks have largely defaulted to legal political advocacy. Nevertheless, aided by covert funding mechanisms that have come to the fore, a new generation of American Hamas sympathizers are almost certainly [providing](#) funds to Palestinian FTOs through ad hoc cryptocurrency-based financing schemes, anonymizing the donors and recipients with the intent of shielding them from prosecution.

Hamas supporters in the US are likely to engage in sporadic, unplanned acts of violence against counter-protestors and individuals who visually appear to be Jewish or considered supporters of Israel, although they are very unlikely to carry out mass casualty attacks. The overwhelming majority of Hamas- and PIJ-related prosecutions in the US have focused on financial support networks, and Hamas is not known as an organization to have ever encouraged its supporters in the US to carry out terrorist attacks on its behalf. Nonetheless, US law enforcement officials continue to [assess](#) that Hamas attacks in the US cannot be ruled out; at least one [investigation](#) in 2023 involved a Palestinian national in the US who was allegedly planning to conduct an attack targeting the Jewish community. Even in that case, however, prosecutors did not allege any links to Hamas, and the suspect was later [acquitted](#) by a federal jury.

## Hezbollah

Similar to Hamas, Hezbollah's supporters are very unlikely to carry out a terrorist attack in the US in 2024. However, unlike Hamas, Hezbollah very likely [retains](#) significant external operations capabilities — largely through its Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) — that have previously been responsible for, and very likely retain the capabilities to, plot attacks in the US.<sup>2</sup> In the past, IJO operatives have carried out several notable external [operations](#) in the West, and although their efforts were thwarted, they have attempted to [plan](#) terrorist attacks on US soil.

If certain developments in Israel's ongoing war with Hamas take place, Hezbollah would be likely to [refocus](#) on planning attacks in the US. In 2023, the Israel-Hamas conflict [threatened](#) to expand to a second front between Israel and Hezbollah, a circumstance that would likely entail increased Hezbollah threats to Israel's allies and especially to the US. In [previous reporting](#), we assessed that these developments are unlikely to occur in 2024. However, if a second front [opens](#) between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2024, Hezbollah would be likely to target the US. These [threats](#) would be especially likely if the US military supports, or becomes directly involved in, an Israeli ground campaign in Lebanon.

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<sup>2</sup> The Islamic Jihad Organization is also known as the External Security Organization or Unit 910.

According to a 2022 academic [study](#), the vast majority of prosecutions of HVEs with a nexus to Hezbollah during the previous twenty years have involved individuals who provided financial support to the group. The majority of those involved in operational planning were attempting to procure weapons for the group in Lebanon or participate in human smuggling or drug trafficking operations. Nevertheless, at least one case [involved](#) an IJO attack planner who trained with the group overseas, entered the US, and surveilled several targets for a Hezbollah attack on US soil. Although the plot was disrupted, this activity demonstrated Hezbollah's capacity for external operations and a willingness, given particular circumstances, to directly target the US.

## Domestic Violent Extremists

In 2024, DVEs are very likely to carry out physical threat activities against US government personnel — especially election and judicial officials — racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, commercial facilities, and US critical infrastructure. As in previous years, white supremacist and neo-Nazi violent extremists are most likely among DVEs to conduct mass-casualty terrorist attacks, although we project that attacks conducted by AVEs and AGAAVEs will constitute a larger share of the total DVE violence in 2024 than in previous years, due to greater calls for violent direct action within AVE circles and the mobilization factor of the 2024 US presidential election for AGAAVEs motivated by political animus. The degree of this projection will almost certainly be influenced by the nature of, and specific trends in, the 2024 presidential elections; as noted in previous [analyses](#), higher levels of contestation and polarization in the election cycle will very likely lead to a greater level of DVE violence.

DVEs are very likely to [select](#) aspects of multiple DVE ideologies and movements to create their own, personalized worldview, and the categories listed below are generalized heuristics for evaluating DVE activity in the US as opposed to mutually exclusive groupings. On an individual level — and even on a small cell or group level — DVEs are very likely to fit into multiple categories below.

## White Supremacist and Neo-Nazi Violent Extremists

### *Neo-Nazi Accelerationists*

Lone actors associated with the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement — who [believe](#) that terrorist violence is necessary to hasten the destruction of Western civilization and its replacement with white supremacist societies — are very likely to plan and attempt to conduct mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the US in 2024. The most recent accelerationist-related terrorist attack in the US occurred on August 23, 2023, when Ryan Palmeter conducted a [shooting](#) at a Dollar General store in Jacksonville, Florida, killing three store patrons before committing suicide. Palmeter's manifesto contained a litany of references to his neo-Nazi accelerationist beliefs, invoking previous accelerationist attackers and internet memes associated with the broader movement.<sup>3</sup> In recent years, lone-actor accelerationist mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the US have largely [targeted](#) large commercial facilities, especially

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<sup>3</sup> Source document retained by Insikt Group, available upon request.

grocery stores, large department stores, and retail facilities, and perpetrators have generally used firearms, causing a significant number of casualties.

Neo-Nazi accelerationists are also almost certain to continue [promoting](#) attacks against critical infrastructure — particularly the electric grid — in 2024, by publishing online instructional guides and issuing calls for attacks in accelerationist online communities. Attacks against critical infrastructure have been a primary [focus](#) of actors associated with the movement for several years, and historically, accelerationists have timed attack plots against the electric grid, communications, and transportation infrastructure to coincide with periods of maximum use and heightened social tensions. Previous research [found](#) a spike in attack plots targeting critical infrastructure during the run-up to, and directly following, the 2020 US presidential election. We expect accelerationists to attempt to take advantage of polarization during the 2024 US election to plan similar attacks.

Today, the neo-Nazi accelerationist movement is almost entirely [concentrated](#) online, predominantly in a group of Telegram channels that use the endonyms “Terrorgram” or the “Terrorgram Collective”. Due to law enforcement pressure, infighting, and internal ideological disputes (particularly regarding the alignment of accelerationists with the Satanist group Order of Nine Angles/O9A), neo-Nazi accelerationist organizations such as the Atomwaffen Division, Feuerkrieg Division, and The Base are almost entirely defunct. Although certain individuals and small groups — particularly individuals associated with The Base — have attempted to reunite online accelerationists under a single organization, we do not expect these efforts to come to fruition in 2024.

### **Active Clubs**

White supremacist active clubs are very likely to [demonstrate](#) outside local businesses, houses of worship, and public facilities hosting events that involve the LGBTQIA+ community and are additionally likely to demonstrate outside US election facilities in areas where issues or candidates controversial among DVEs are subject to a vote. The white supremacist active club movement — referring to small, local groups of white supremacist DVEs who train in hand-to-hand combat to violently confront ideological opponents at protests and rallies — has substantially [grown](#) in popularity in recent years, with the establishment of active clubs in nearly all 50 US states and over 20 countries worldwide, according to Insikt Group data. Most active club protests have been [hostile](#), but have not led to violence; the presence of counter-protestors (particularly AVE counter-protestors) heightens the risk of escalation and violent confrontation.

A variety of clubs are almost certain to remain active in 2024. These include clubs affiliated with nationwide organizations, such as Patriot Front chapters, as well as local active clubs in almost every US state. Among the clubs that are most likely to be active in 2024 are:

- NSC-131, a New England-based organization that [conducted](#) a number of notable protests outside of government facilities and the private residences of government officials in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine in 2023



- The Northwest Nationalist Network (NNN), a cluster of active clubs that [operate](#) in the Pacific Northwest
- Blood Tribe, an upstart group that conducted highly visible demonstrations in several US states in 2023

### ***Other White Supremacist and Neo-Nazi Violent Extremists***

White supremacist and neo-Nazi DVEs will very likely continue to threaten racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, commercial facilities, educational institutions, and non-governmental organizations in 2024. These actors are especially likely to conduct doxing and swatting attacks. On January 12, 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) [reported](#) that malicious actors — almost certainly including white supremacist and neo-Nazi DVEs — made over 100 bomb threats to over 1,000 organizations in 42 states, including religious facilities, community centers, schools, hospitals, airports, and government buildings, in the period between December 8, 2023, and January 12, 2024.

These doxing and swatting threats likely originate from white supremacist and neo-Nazi DVEs who are unaffiliated with the accelerationist movement or with active clubs and are participants in loose networks of DVEs who largely congregate online. On December 12, 2023, an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force [arrested](#) a resident of California who was a minor, alleging he was a member of an “online swatting ring” that conducted a spree of swatting attacks targeting synagogues and African-American churches. DVE swatting groups are very likely [transnational](#), with some members residing outside of the US, according to FBI intelligence [assessments](#).

### **Militia and Anti-Government Violent Extremists**

In 2024, there will very likely be incidents involving MVEs and AGAAVEs motivated by partisan animus who physically threaten US election, judicial, and law enforcement officials. These activities are likely to be conducted by individual MVEs and AGAAVEs, and small, locally organized groups of these DVEs. In 2022 and 2023, specific MVE and AGAAVE organizations that posed a serious threat to the 2020 US presidential election — namely the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys — were almost certainly hampered by law enforcement pressure, including the prosecution and sentencing of several of their key leaders in investigations related to their January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol. However, the number of adherents of MVE or AGAAVE ideologies is unlikely to have changed since the 2020 election, and specific developments in the 2024 election would very likely drive mass mobilization and violence on a similar scale as the previous presidential election.

The US militia movement has almost certainly [decentralized](#) since January 6, 2021, but it is very unlikely to have weakened as a result. In the decade before January 6, 2021, the Oath Keepers were arguably the [paragon](#) of the modern militia movement, namely because they were able to consolidate members of local militias throughout the country into a single umbrella organization. In 2022, eleven Oath Keepers — including the organization’s de facto leader, Stewart Rhodes — were [arrested](#) and charged with seditious conspiracy for their role in the January 6th attack; Rhodes was found [guilty](#) in late 2022

and [sentenced](#) to eighteen years in prison in 2023. The Proud Boys, co-participants in the January 6th attack, also had many of its senior leaders, including its chairman Enrique Tarrio, convicted and [sentenced](#) to lengthy terms in prison for their roles in the assault.

Nevertheless, individual MVEs and AGAAVEs motivated by partisan animus have continued to threaten and plot violence largely against US government personnel and facilities, and are especially likely to threaten election personnel, candidates for public office, and judicial officials in 2024. An August 2023 analysis from the National Counterterrorism, Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE) [found](#) that federal charges for individuals who threatened public officials spiked in 2022 and 2023, and the trendline is expected to continue into 2024. The majority of these threats were likely communicated by AGAAVEs harboring partisan animus, according to the NCITE analysis, and several were coupled with a demonstrated intent to carry out the threat — such as the August 2023 case involving Craig Robertson, a Utah man who [threatened](#) to kill several public officials including US president Joe Biden and attempted to open fire on FBI agents serving a [warrant](#) at his house, resulting in his death.

Physical threat incidents involving MVEs and AGAAVEs are especially likely to [occur](#) in 2024 if the upcoming election cycle has closely contested races, extended election processes (such as recounts, audits, or the failure of a losing candidate to concede), or controversial social and political issues (especially involving abortion, gun control, or LGBTQIA+ issues). MVEs and AGAAVEs would also be very likely to [target](#) judicial officials if the results of legal cases involving the presidential candidates are unfavorable to their cause or affect their ability to run for office. Despite their current lack of nationwide organization, a highly contested election cycle or results unfavorable to MVEs and AGAAVEs would likely [prompt](#) coordinated demonstrations and nationwide mobilization, creating the likelihood of violent events similar to the protests and attacks during the 2020 election cycle.

## Anarchist Violent Extremists

AVEs are almost certain to engage in a range of physical threat activities in 2024 — including sabotage, vandalism, property destruction, harassment, protests, and riots — and are also very likely to engage in cyber threat activities such as doxing and website defacements. In 2023, Israel's war against Hamas, as well as the construction of the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center (APSTC, colloquially known as Cop City) and the Mountain Valley Pipeline, mobilized AVE groups throughout the country to target private sector entities that they believed were financing, supporting, or otherwise aligned with these causes. We expect these trends to continue into 2024, although AVEs' almost certain inability to influence change on these issues through non-violent protests and demonstrations will likely lead to AVE actors adopting progressively violent and destructive TTPs in 2024. While AVEs are unlikely to conduct violence against people and very unlikely to conduct mass-casualty attacks, the scope of AVE violence targeting properties is likely to increase in 2024.

Geopolitical and domestic political events are very likely driving AVEs' heightened operational tempo. Chief among these issues is likely the Israel-Hamas conflict; US AVEs generally view Israel as an illegitimate entity, are opposed to Israel's conduct in the Palestinian territories, and view themselves as in solidarity with armed Palestinian resistance groups. Throughout 2023, AVEs conducted physical

threat activities targeting businesses — particularly cleared defense contractors (CDCs), banks, and financial institutions — that they believed maintained relationships with the Israeli government or military. In conjunction, ongoing local [protest movements](#) against the construction of the APSTC and the proposed construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline drew nationwide [attention](#) from AVEs across the US in 2023, leading to several acts of sabotage throughout the country that were reportedly conducted on behalf of these movements.

Several AVE sources have noted that nonviolent means of direct action employed by the anarchist movement to influence the aforementioned issues did not lead to significant results, and have promoted violent direct action as a result. The Israel-Hamas conflict, the APSTC, and the Mountain Valley Pipeline project, among other issues, are almost certain to remain salient issues for AVEs in 2024. Amid increased incitement by anarchist groups and counter-information sites, as well as AVEs' promotion of manuals detailing TTPs for attacks and sabotage against critical infrastructure, the frequency and intensity of AVE violence is likely to increase in 2024. While targeting similar entities — such as the offices of CDCs, banks, financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and local businesses — AVEs will be increasingly likely to prefer sabotage, arson, attacks with incendiary devices, and other destructive means of attacking properties in 2024. They are also very likely to threaten these organizations' personnel and infrastructure through online doxing, harassment, and website defacement campaigns.

## Other Domestic Violent Extremists

The aforementioned DVE threat actors are almost certain to borrow aspects from a variety of distinct DVE ideologies, based on ongoing ideological trends and developments in their respective movements. For instance, neo-Nazi accelerationists have frequently appropriated concepts from [environmental violent extremism](#), and, on an individual level and to a lesser degree, from [jihadist Salafism](#). Given their mutual interest in and perspectives on the Israel-Hamas conflict, convergences between Hamas-supporting HVEs and AVEs are also especially [likely](#) in 2024. This [phenomenon](#), referred to as “salad bar”, “composite”, “mixed, unclear, or unstable”, or “blended” violent extremism, is very likely to shape the US's violent extremist landscape in 2024.

Outside of the HVE and DVE categories surveyed above, the most likely group to plot mass-casualty attacks in the US in 2024 are [misogynist involuntary celibates](#) (incels). In this [context](#), misogynist incels are heterosexual males that blame women for their inability to obtain a sexual or romantic partner. During the last decade, there have been several mass-casualty attacks and plots [perpetrated](#) by self-proclaimed adherents of this ideology, including at least two [plots](#) in the US in 2023 alone. Incel DVEs are very likely to use firearms in lone-actor attacks, target schools and local businesses, and post in anonymous online forums of like-minded individuals — all of which very likely [diminish](#) the probability of law enforcement interdiction.

Single-issue DVEs, especially those motivated by pro- or anti-abortion viewpoints, are also likely to conduct physical threat activities in the US. If major judicial rulings or election results that significantly limit access to abortion are enacted in 2024, DVEs who favor access to abortion are very likely to

vandalize, sabotage, and plan to conduct firebombings and arsons targeting pregnancy resource centers and pro-life organizations. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in *Dobbs v. Jackson* in 2022, actors referring to themselves as "Jane's Revenge" — who almost certainly shared personnel and TTPs with local AVE groups — conducted a [series of attacks](#) in several states using the TTPs and targets described above. Anti-abortion DVEs are likely to [target](#) abortion providers, facilities that provide abortions, and pro-abortion candidates for office, using harassment, illegal demonstrations, and in limited cases, mass-casualty attacks and assassinations.

## Outlook

In 2024, the US will almost certainly continue to face diverse physical threats from a wide variety of HVE and DVE threat actors with unique — but at times, overlapping — ideologies, targets, TTPs, and levels of capability. Before 2023, the predominant threat of terrorist attacks on US soil largely emanated from white supremacist and neo-Nazi violent extremists, as well as from IS supporters, with other HVE and DVE groups sporadically attempting to strike the US. Among other factors, the Israel-Hamas conflict and the growth and development of ISKP in late 2023 and early 2024 have exacerbated the HVE threat to the US. Federal, state, and local law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence agencies will almost certainly be forced to contend with simultaneous, heightened HVE and DVE threats in 2024, likely causing resource strains, triaging of threats, and personnel gaps that may negatively affect the US's domestic counterterrorism posture.

As in previous years, the threat of mass-casualty terrorist attacks on US soil will very likely continue to be shaped by the activities of two groups: American IS supporters and neo-Nazi accelerationists. Nevertheless, a miscellany of HVE and DVE threat actors will almost certainly conduct other physical threat activities that pose significant risks for organizations in the public and private sectors alike, especially through sabotage, attacks against property, doxing, and swatting. Beyond physical risks to human life and property, these TTPs can cause serious operational, financial, reputational, and psychological harm to organizations and their personnel. Additionally, several HVE and DVE movements without significant recent histories of conducting major campaigns of violence — very likely driven by geopolitical and domestic political events — will likely intend to pursue more lethal or damaging TTPs in the near term, especially US supporters of Hamas, AVEs, and AGAAVEs motivated by partisan animus.

HVE and DVE threat actors alike have defaulted to a lone-actor operational model, which has very likely lessened the sophistication of their physical threat activities but has also likely made it more difficult for organizations that may be targeted to monitor, report, and mitigate violent extremist threats. Certain organizations and individuals — particularly US government agencies and organizations connected to racial, ethnic, and religious minorities or the LGBTQIA+ community — are perennial targets for HVE and DVE physical threats, and should constantly monitor HVE and DVE reactions to ongoing geopolitical and domestic political events to determine their level of risk. Other organizations and individuals that may become targets for HVEs or DVEs due to specific sociopolitical developments should acquaint themselves with specific issues of note for violent extremists and the activities of specific threat actors that have previously targeted their sector or industry.



To monitor threats from violent extremists, organizations can leverage the Recorded Future Intelligence Cloud to track references to their organizations, reactions to ongoing geopolitical and domestic political events, and promotion of TTPs for physical threat activities in sources popular among DVEs and HVEs. Today, violent extremist communities online largely congregate on mainstream social media and a variety of messaging applications, particularly those that offer encryption. One particularly pertinent indicator that an organization is likely at risk from HVE or DVE physical threat activities in the near term — in addition to the data points described above — is undue attention paid to that organization in HVE or DVE sources or commentary, particularly when combined with negative sentiment directed toward that organization. By monitoring these campaigns, organizations can determine whether it is appropriate to augment their physical security posture to mitigate risks from violent extremist threat activities.

## Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Except where otherwise noted, Recorded Future's definitions and categories of violent extremism are adapted from US Intelligence Community documents, including:

- [“Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021”](#), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 1, 2021
- [“US Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators”](#), National Counterterrorism Center, 2021 edition
- [“Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism”](#), Federal Bureau of Investigation/Department of Homeland Security, October 2022

**Homegrown violent extremist (HVE):** “an individual who advocates, engages in, or is preparing to engage in or support terrorist activities in furtherance of a foreign terrorist organization’s objectives, but who is acting independently of foreign terrorist direction”.

- HVEs who adhere to **jihadi Salafism** believe in the use of violence or armed force to achieve the fundamental goals and objectives of the Salafi movement: most importantly, the restoration of the Islamic religion to its practice during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers, the rejection of perceived alternative or aberrant practices of the religion, and the reestablishment of Islamic systems of governance.<sup>4</sup>

**Domestic violent extremist (DVE):** “an individual based and operating primarily in the United States without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power and who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. This assessment does not evaluate the actions of individuals engaged solely in activities protected by the First Amendment or other rights secured by the Constitution of the United States”.

- **White supremacist violent extremist:** DVEs with “ideological agendas derived from bias ... related to race or ethnicity”, who “believe in the superiority of the white race”.
  - **Neo-Nazi violent extremist:** DVEs with “ideological agendas derived from bias ... related to race or ethnicity”, who “believe in the superiority of the white race” and promote the actions, ideology, governance model, leaders, or propaganda of Nazism or seek to establish a Nazi-inspired governing structure in the US.<sup>5</sup>
  - **Neo-Nazi accelerationist:** Neo-Nazi violent extremists who believe that terrorist violence is necessary to hasten the destruction of Western civilization and its replacement with white supremacist societies.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Insikt Group definition, adapted from Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Insikt Group definition, adapted from Arie Perliger, “Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 2012.

<sup>6</sup> Insikt Group definition, adapted from Alex Newhouse, “The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism,” *CTS Sentinel* 14:5 (June 2021).

- **White supremacist active club:** A group of white supremacist DVEs who train in hand-to-hand combat and other activities to violently confront ideological opponents.<sup>7</sup>
- **Anti-government/anti-authority violent extremist (AGAAVE):** DVEs “with ideological agendas derived from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies; or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy”.
  - **Militia violent extremist (MVE):** DVEs “who take overt steps to violently resist or facilitate the overthrow of the US government in support of their belief that the US government is purposely exceeding its Constitutional authority and is trying to establish a totalitarian regime” and may “oppose many federal and state laws and regulations, particularly those related to firearms ownership”.
  - **Anarchist violent extremist (AVE):** DVEs “who oppose all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions, which are perceived as harmful to society”.

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<sup>7</sup> Insikt Group definition, adapted from Ciarán O'Connor et al., “Active Clubs: The Growing Threat of ‘White Nationalism 3.0’ Across the United States,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue Insight Brief*, October 24, 2023.

Recorded Future reporting contains expressions of likelihood or probability consistent with US Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203: [Analytic Standards](#) (published January 2, 2015). Recorded Future reporting also uses confidence level standards [employed](#) by the US Intelligence Community to assess the quality and quantity of the source information supporting our analytic judgments.

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