Inside China’s National Defense Mobilization Reform: Capacity Surveys, Mobilization Resources, and “New-Type” Militias
Another core part of national defense mobilization reform is the creation of increasingly specialized militia forces, an effort that began in the early 2000s but has accelerated under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s leadership. As documented in the second section of this report, China’s “New-Type” Militias, these forces are intended, at least at the conceptual level, to carry out emergency response tasks, support the needs of modern warfare, and help extend China’s military power into new strategic spaces such as cyberspace, outer space, and the polar regions. New-type militia forces are largely established by recruiting well-educated, higher-skill professionals from China’s civilian economy under the MCF strategic framework. Although these forces continue to face challenges, they are involved in COVID-19 management in China, in the South China Sea, in cyberspace capabilities development, and in other matters that affect the international community. Monitoring militia development as well as the broader pool of mobilization resources available to the party-state and PLA both in China and around the world is, thus, a prerequisite for adequate policy and defense planning among members of the international community concerned with China’s armed forces modernization and national defense activities.

Executive Summary

Near-continuous reforms to China’s national defense mobilization system over the past several decades have sought to strengthen the country’s capacity to counter threats to the party-state and homeland. The latest of these reforms is a new method of cataloging and accounting for the thousands of military and civilian resources that the party-state and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can bring to bear in upholding China’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security at home and abroad. The first section of this report, A New Mobilization Planning System, introduces this new method and draws on a draft document authored by the National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD) of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to shed unprecedented light on the full range of resources likely enrolled in ongoing military-civil fusion (MCF) mobilization efforts. These resources are located both in China and overseas and provide a window into how the authorities in China evaluate the country’s strategic posture; they include, but are not limited to, resources related to weapons research, maritime transport, cyber capabilities, public opinion guidance, natural resources, and space-based technologies.

Key Judgments

- The national defense mobilization resources identified in this report will almost certainly play a role in the future domestic and international activities of China’s armed forces, as well as enhance the PLA’s capacity to operate globally, including in cyberspace.
- By standardizing the categories of, and data collection templates for, national defense mobilization resources, the newly implemented resource accounting method is likely to strengthen China’s peacetime and wartime preparedness and the efficacy of its crisis and conflict management efforts.
- New-type militia construction and related reforms seek to streamline and upskill China’s militia forces, not expand their overall number, and will likely enhance the value of the militia as a supporting force for the PLA in future conflicts, though significant challenges remain.
- Looking to the future, new-type militia force construction will likely focus on maritime reconnaissance, transport, and search and rescue; border and coastal defense, including escort and language interpretation; network (cyber) space capabilities, including network attack and public opinion guidance; and various activities related to intelligence collection, specialized military equipment support, and strategic frontier operations; among other areas.
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A New Mobilization Planning System

Many eyes were trained on the South China Sea in early March 2021 after a Philippine naval task force spotted more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels moored at Whitsun Reef. Subsequent investigation showed this fishing fleet to comprise, at least in part, a detachment from China’s maritime militia (海上民兵) — a reserve force (后备力量) primarily staffed by civilian mariners (often fishers) within China’s armed forces system that is at the vanguard of Beijing’s assertion of sovereignty over its claimed waters. As tensions between China and the Philippines mounted, the National Defense Mobilization Department (国防动员部) of China’s Central Military Commission (中央军事委员会) convened an important 3-day work conference in Wuhan, Hubei Province, that went largely unnoticed outside of China. The purpose of the conference was to implement a new system for cataloging and quantifying China’s national defense mobilization capacity. The goal of this new system is to improve the ability of the party-state and armed forces to face and resolve threats to the party-state and homeland.

During the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Work Training Conference (全国国防动员潜力统计调查业务培训会) in Wuhan, held between March 16 and 19, 2021, the CMC NDMD specifically rolled out a new version of the national defense mobilization latent capacity information system (国防动员潜力信息系统) as well as a new version of the national defense mobilization latent capacity statistical survey indexing system (国防动员潜力统计调查指标体系). In attendance were representatives from the Mobilization Bureaus of all theater commands (战区动员局) and relevant personnel for all provincial military districts. The CMC NDMD is “responsible for organizing and instructing the national defense mobilization [of China] and the construction of reserve forces... [in a way] conducive to intensifying the strategic organization and leadership in those aspects”. The CMC NDMD “organizes national defense mobilization preparation and implementation work” in cooperation with other national-level institutions of the party-state as well as through the national defense mobilization system that involves local (provincial and sub-provincial) military districts and national defense mobilization committees under the State Council (NDMC; 国防动员委员会).

Each year, NDMCs and their military counterparts conduct a national defense mobilization capacity survey within their jurisdictions to take stock of the instruments of mobilization available to the party-state. Such surveys are codified in China’s 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law, which assigns mobilization capacity assessment responsibilities to military and party-state institutions at the county level and above. Since 2018, the CMC NDMD has further organized “the mobilization departments of each theater command (战区动员部门) to verify jurisdiction capacity face-to-face.” The timing varies between localities, but the 2021 mobilization capacity surveys began in the months following the Wuhan conference.

The updated versions of the information system and survey indexing system introduced in March 2021 are intended to strengthen peacetime and wartime preparedness by facilitating the work of national defense mobilization capacity surveys and alleviating “the phenomena of active duty forces requiring an ‘apple’ [while] localities provide a ‘white pear’ (现部队要“苹果”、地方给“鸭梨”的现象)”.

The survey indexing system provides a deeper set of metrics that the NDMCs and other institutions must collect for each resource class in order to increase visibility over mobilization resources and bolster the reliability of mobilization efforts. The new survey indexing system further aims to increase the standardization of collection metrics with reference to national and industry standards, as well as streamline the work that goes into accounting for mobilization capacity.
The new information system and survey indexing system follow requirements for “perfecting the national defense mobilization system” (完善国防动员体系), as emphasized during the 19th Party Congress in 2017 and written into the 2020 revision of China’s National Defense Law (中华人民共和国国防法). They are part of broader and related reforms to national defense mobilization planning work, including the adoption of electronic record-keeping and mobilization requirements reporting; a report on the March 2021 training conference highlights how an unspecified theater command was able to search the capacity of its corresponding jurisdiction “Taobao-style”, referencing a popular online marketplace in China. Speaking with the press, a staff member of the CMC NDMD indicated the new information and survey indexing systems would, like past versions, continue to be revised as needed. Per a decision issued by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in October 2021, China is currently reforming the national defense mobilization system itself; the nature of these changes is not yet clear but may affect the accuracy of the foregoing description of how national defense mobilization capacity surveys are organized.

This report investigates 1 of the 2 documents studied during the CMC NDMD’s March training conference in detail: an interim draft of the new National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System, which was “organized, debated, [and] compiled” (组织论证编制) by the CMC NDMD. The 677-page document reveals not only how the leadership of China’s armed forces conceives of the military and civilian resources needed for ensuring the party-state’s strength and security — an important aspect of China’s military-civil fusion strategy — it also provides insight into the types of militias operating as part of Beijing’s reserve force. In particular, the document sheds light on the concept of “new-type” (新型) militias that has become prominent since 2017.
说明

为加强和规范国防动员潜力统计调查工作，有效支撑国家国防动员战略筹划和军事斗争准备，军委国防动员部组织论证编制了《国防动员潜力统计调查指标体系》。

编制依据。根据中共中央《军民融合发展战略纲要》和国务院、中央军委《国防动员建设“十三五”规划》部署要求，遵循《中华人民共和国国防动员法》《中华人民共和国统计法》《中华人民共和国统计法实施条例》《国防动员潜力统计调查规定》等国家和军队相关政策法规，依据军委机关、战区、军兵种部队提出的动员需求，参考国家统计制度和行业标准，组织论证编制。

遵循原则。编制工作坚持满足需求和合理适度相结合、辅助战略决策和支撑作战指挥相结合、共性指标和个性需求相结合、部队运用习惯和地方统计标准相结合、宏观总体情况和微观个体信息相结合、传统领域资源和新兴新质力量相结合的原则。

编制过程。组织军地专家力量，历时15个月，按照论证编制《国防动员潜力目录》《国防动员潜力统计调查指标》《国防动员潜力统计调查指标体系》三个阶段开展。先后三个波次与军委机关、战区、军兵种部队对接需求，深入各战区、相关省军区以及重点潜力企业开展调研，汇总3500余项动员需求清单；两次召开国家战略层面国防动员潜力统计对接协调会，三轮68批次赴39个中央机关、国家部委和大型央企对接地方行业标准，收集梳理90余套国家和部门统计调查制度；对照动员需求和行业标准，召开50余次座谈会，广泛深入征求军地各级相关部门意见，动态做好“军标”和“国标”的翻译转化工作。

— 1 —
Accounting for Mobilization Capacity

China's national defense mobilization system has a wide range of responsibilities, relying on thousands of unique resources to achieve its mission. National defense mobilization strength is almost certainly seen as the “ability to use precisely the instrument, capability, or resource needed, when needed, [and] for the duration needed” to manage threats to China's “sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security” at the decision of the State Council and CMC. The new national defense mobilization latent capacity statistical survey indexing system seeks to catalog and standardize the full range of potential resources that the party-state or armed forces may need to defend or advance China's interests. The full list of resources provides a window into both how China likely evaluates its strategic posture as well as the areas of China's economy that are of great relevance to MCF efforts.

The overarching task of defending China's sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security outlined above entails maintaining war readiness, preparing for potential foreign attacks on the homeland, and addressing concerns of political and social stability, such as the potential for “color revolutions”. The purview of national defense mobilization work is further enlarged to include the needs of “military operations other than war” (MOOTW; 非战争军事行动) and the management of non-military contingencies, such as natural disasters, in part because China's national defense mobilization system is intimately linked with the country's broader emergency response mechanism. Since China's interests are global in nature, and the armed forces — which include the People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police (PAP), and the militia — are responsible for “peacekeeping, maritime law enforcement, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief” regionally and farther abroad, the scope of national defense mobilization planning likewise expands internationally. A 2018 article authored by the head of the Jilin Province Military District Mobilization Bureau (吉林省军区动员局) further identified 5 priorities for national defense mobilization: serving the comprehensive national security strategy, guaranteeing the security needs of the strategic directions of theater commands, providing rescue and disaster relief, ensuring rights protection and stability maintenance, and serving the MCF development strategy.

As a result of these diverse missions, the number of requirements for which China's national defense mobilization capacity indexing system seeks to account is extensive: more than 4,400 requirements in the final version. The draft copy of the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System analyzed in this report identifies more than 3,500 requirements divided into 9 classes of mobilization resources (Figure 3). Each of the 9 classes is further divided into at least 3 resource subclasses, most (but not all) of which are divided again according to specific mobilization instruments for which the provincial NDMCs and other institutions must account. Mobilization instruments are the relatively specific tools and resources available for use during a time of need. See Figure 4 for examples of mobilization instruments that fall under the Emerging Domains Class of resources. A glossary of terms for this section is available in Part 1 of Appendix A.
### Overall/General Class

- National Defense Mobilization Committee Administrative Institutions
- Grassroots People’s Armed Forces Departments
- Population, Economic, and Agricultural Resources
- Extractive Resources

### Reserve Force Class

- Retired Military Personnel
- Active Reserve Force Personnel (现役部队预编预备役人员)
- Registered Reserve Force Personnel (编入预备役部队预备役人员)
- Militia Forces

### National Economy Class

- Major and Supplemental Foodstuffs
- Fuel Logistics Resources
- Medicine and Healthcare Resources
- Nuclear and Chemical Disaster Emergency Response Resources
- Delivery Instruments Repair and Manufacture Resources
- Engineering and Construction Resources
- Equipment and Material
- Meteorological and Hydrological Charting Resources
- Civilian-Use Explosive Resources
- Emergency Supply Reserves
- Safe Production and Emergency Rescue Resources
- National and Local Economic Mobilization Centers

### Civil Air Defense Class

- Civil Air Defense Key Shelter Cities
- Civil Air Defense Command Posts
- Civil Air Defense Engineering Projects
- Civil Air Defense Evacuation Zones (Bases)
- Civil Air Defense Alarm Installations
- Civil Air Defense Specialist Teams

### Transportation Class

- Transportation Infrastructure
- Transport Delivery and Hauling Capacity
- War Preparation Material Transportation Resources
- Transportation Specialist Teams
- Maritime Search and Rescue Forces

### Political Mobilization Class

- State Security Research Institutions
- Internet Supervision and Public Sentiment Guidance Institutions
- Internet and Information Services Enterprises
- Radio and Television Institutions
- Legal Services Institutions
- Psychological Consulting Institutions
- Human Resources (e.g., Language Translation/Interpretation Personnel)

### Weapons/Equipment Class

- Weapons and Equipment Research and Development Institutions
- Weapons and Equipment Production Enterprises
- Weapons and Equipment Maintenance Enterprises
- Weapons and Equipment Specialist Support Teams

### Emerging Domains Class

- Maritime Resources
- Space Resources
- Network Space Resources (i.e., Cyberspace and Communications)
- Biological Resources
- New Energy Resources
- Artificial Intelligence Resources
- Scientific Research, Universities and Academies, and Scientific Research Results

### Overseas Resources Class

- Overseas Embassies and Consulates
- Overseas Enterprises
- Overseas Chinese Organizations

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*Figure 3: Mobilization resource classes and subclasses® (Source: Draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System)*
As stated above, the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System identifies specific instruments of mobilization for nearly every resource subclass seen in Figure 3. Each of these instruments, in turn, is accompanied by a specific list of information that should be collected when surveying mobilization capacity. Indeed, much of the document's 677 pages are used to provide blank spreadsheets for each mobilization instrument (Figure 5 and Figure 8, for example). The draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System further specifies which government organ at the national or local levels holds the relevant information.

The examples provided below demonstrate the level of detail that the new survey indexing system seeks to achieve for 2 mobilization resource classes. The examples also illustrate how (operationally, not organizationally) some of the mobilization instruments under these resource classes can be used internationally.

**Emerging Domains Class (新兴领域类)**

This class of resources, its subclasses, and its mobilization instruments provide insight into the types of dual-use technologies that the CMC NDMD very likely assess as contributing to China's national defense under the MCF strategy. The version of the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System assessed here includes 7 subclasses related to emerging domains. Each of these is further divided into multiple specific mobilization instruments. The draft document also includes spreadsheets that specify the data to be collected for each instrument (Figure 5) and indicates which authority is responsible for maintaining the relevant data (partially visible in Figure 6). There are 58 total mobilization instruments listed under the Emerging Domains Class, too many to translate here. Many of the mobilization instruments are also further divided into yet more specific types of resources. A small sample of these instruments and their corresponding data authority is provided below (Figure 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Instrument</th>
<th>Data Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Oil/Gas Observation Platforms</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-Scale Cybersecurity Enterprises</td>
<td>Cyberspace Administration of China; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; Ministry of Public Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large and Super-Large Data Centers</td>
<td>Cyberspace Administration of China; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyberspace Ranges</td>
<td>Cyberspace Administration of China; Ministry of Public Security; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Use Fiber Optic Cable Communications and Transmission Networks, WDM Channels</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; 6 Large Telecommunications Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological and Bionic Materials</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; National Defense Science and Industry Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Systems Control Products (incl. for aircraft, boats, submarines, and cars)</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; National Defense Science and Industry Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robotics (incl. for industrial, medical, and military uses)</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; National Defense Science and Industry Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Interpretation Products (incl. for graphics, language, and facial recognition)</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; National Defense Science and Industry Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Modeling Systems</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology; National Defense Science and Industry Departments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Select Emerging Domains Class mobilization instruments (Source: Draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System)
A way in which the overseas mobilization instruments of the Emerging Domains Class will likely be used in future conflicts is through the incorporation of private and public cybersecurity talent into PLA cyber-wafare operations. The 2013 edition of Science of Military Strategy from the Academy of Military Science (中国人民解放军军事科学院) identifies 2 types of network (cyber) operation forces beyond the PLA’s operational units (described as “Professional Network Warfare Forces”; 专业网络战力量), including those from government departments (described as “Authorized Forces”; 授权力量) and “nongovernmental” entities (described as “Civilian Forces”; 民间力量). The latter category almost certainly includes the personnel of the Large-Scale Cybersecurity Enterprises mobilization instrument listed in Figure 4. More recent research by John Chen, Joe McReynolds, and Kieran Green confirms “that China’s [military] cyberspace capabilities can still be temporarily augmented by incorporating elite network operators from civilian government agencies, private entities, and institutions. These operators would be folded into professional — that is, military — cyberspace forces to jointly participate in cyberspace operations.” Notably, this form of mobilization is likely distinct from the creation of network (cyber) militia forces at cybersecurity enterprises and universities discussed later in this report (see China’s “New-Type” Militias and Appendix B).
### 潜力统计数据来源表

<table>
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<tr>
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### 潜力统计数据来源表

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Figure 6: Tables from the indexing system that show information sources for part of the Emerging Domains Class and all of the Overseas Resources Class of mobilization resources (Source: Draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System)
Overseas Resources Class (海外资源类)

This class of resources, its subclasses, and its mobilization instruments provide insight into the types of companies, groups, and institutions that the CMC NDMD very likely assess as having the potential to further the international missions of China’s armed forces and the needs of the party-state. These international missions include protecting overseas Chinese citizens and companies, ensuring stable access to strategic resources, and developing the capabilities and capacity to operate globally. These resources can also be leveraged to help resolve domestic crises, as discussed below. The version of the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System assessed here includes 3 subclasses related to overseas resources. Of these, 2 are not broken down into more specific mobilization instruments (Overseas Embassies and Consulates and Overseas Chinese Organizations) and are treated as mobilization instruments themselves, while 1 (Overseas Enterprises) comprises 5 specific mobilization instruments. The draft document also includes spreadsheets regarding the data to be collected for each instrument (Figure 8) and indicates which authority is responsible for maintaining the relevant data (Figure 6, with relevant parts translated in Figure 7 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Instrument</th>
<th>Data Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Embassies and Consulates</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese Organizations</td>
<td>United Front Work Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Chinese Enterprises</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Overseas Extractive Resources</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Ships</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Ports</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Berths</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Overseas Resources Class mobilization instruments (Source: Draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System)
Mobilizing Overseas Resources for Far Seas Naval Operations

**Mobilization Instruments:** Overseas Berths, Major Chinese Enterprises, Overseas Embassies and Consulates

A way in which the overseas mobilization instruments of the Overseas Resources Class can be used is to support and sustain the international presence of PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels. For example, when "the PLAN warship Changbaishan (长白山) docked at Laem Chabang port in Thailand in 2016", Chinese enterprises carried out "berth choice, equipment unloading, and replenishment of the ship's fresh water supply. A general manager from one participating company referenced China's National Defense Transportation Law, stating that Chinese companies have organized employee training sessions to learn about both the concept of national defense transportation and how to service China's warships. Changbaishan's commanding officer added that "wherever there is Chinese business, warships will have a transportation support point (交通保障点)." Moreover, the work of these enterprises was organized through the China's embassy in Thailand. This type of interaction, in which civilian enterprises and their infrastructure is leveraged to support the PLA's overseas presence, will likely form the basis of China's development of "strategic strong points" (战略支点) at or near commercial ports around the world.

Mobilizing Overseas Resources for Domestic Crisis

**Mobilization Instruments:** Overseas Chinese Organizations, Overseas Embassies and Consulates

Another way in which the overseas mobilization instruments of the Overseas Resources Class can be used is to augment domestic resources for coping with emergencies at home. For example, the CCP's United Front-linked All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese issued a call for overseas Chinese persons to "donate money and goods; special medical consumables; protective equipment, including masks... protective caps, protective clothing, protective glasses, [and] disposable latex gloves" in late January 2020 to help China fight the COVID-19 pandemic at home. This initiative succeeded, with diaspora groups sending a reported 2.5 billion medical items to China by the end of February. These calls went out through the mobile messaging app WeChat and were amplified by China's consulates. To facilitate donations, some consulates took additional steps; the consulate in Los Angeles, California, coordinated a no-cost international shipping channel from the United States to China with 3 international Chinese logistics enterprises and "relevant airlines" in support of this effort. This dynamic can work in reverse as well, with Chinese civil-social organizations in China having organized medical supply donations to diaspora organizations overseas as well as to sister cities.
China’s “New-Type” Militias

Militia forces are a critical component of China’s mobilization strength that fall under the Reserve Force Class in Figure 3. In addition to training for warfare-oriented support roles in logistics, intelligence, and defensive operations, Chinese militias also shoulder disaster relief, social stability, and emergency response missions like the broader armed forces. In 2020 and 2021, for example, many militias — including members of various maritime militias — were involved in epidemic prevention and control efforts to combat the spread and effects of COVID-19.

Current militia construction efforts seek to create a “new-type militia force system” (新型民兵力量体系), the focus of which is on ensuring that China’s militia reserve can effectively support “informatized warfare that is [defined by] system-of-systems confrontation [体系对抗] on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and within the electromagnetic spectrum as well as [computer] networks”.

To achieve this goal, as well as to enhance the outcomes of military operations other than war (for example, emergency response operations), new-type militias (新型民兵), also referred to as new-quality militias (新质民兵), seek to absorb specialized and professional skills from China’s modern economy and specialized enterprises through the MCF strategic framework.

English-language research has drawn intermittent attention to the emergence of these new, higher-skill, professional-background militias. For example, a report by Elsa B. Kania and Ian Burns McCaslin highlights an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) militia in Shanghai that was established in 2015. Alex Stone and Peter Wood likewise discuss calls for “extensively recruit[ing] civilian IT and cyber talents to join the militia reserve force” in their comprehensive study of MCF. Other examples of new-type and new-quality militia forces in Chinese sources abound. Several are listed below, and others can be found in Appendix B.

- Employees from various companies in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, were incorporated into 5 new-type militias in June 2020. Nicknamed Snow Eagle Air Patrol (雪鹰空中巡逻队), Snow Pidgeon Polar Communications Team (雪鸽极地通信队), Snow Wolf Extreme Climbing Team (雪狼极限攀登队), and Snow Fox Alpine Fast Reaction Team (雪狐高山快反队), these new-type militias are equipped to enhance aerial reconnaissance, intelligence collection, rescue operations, “countermeasure actions” (反制行动), and stability maintenance.

- Qihoo 360 Technology Co., Ltd. (奇虎360科技有限公司), a cybersecurity company deeply involved (through various subsidiaries and corporate affiliates) in MCF programs, has stood up at least 1 network security militia (网络安全民兵) in the Jiuxianqiao (酒仙桥) suburb of Beijing. The militia uses Qihoo 360’s network security platforms and information technology resources to ensure local network security, train information and network security talent, and research (and presumably carry out if needed) forms of offensive and defensive network operations.

- Southwest University of Science and Technology (SWUST; 西南科技大学) in Mianyang, Sichuan Province, and the Computing Application Research Institute of the China Academy of Engineering Physics (中国工程物理研究院计算机应用研究所) partnered in 2003 to create an “information militia” (信息民兵) — a network (cyber) militia — that is publicly called the SWUST Net Emergency Response Team (SNERT; 西南科技大学校园网络应急响应小组). SNERT is mostly focused on training cybersecurity talent, and has organized training for other Mianyang militia forces involving rapidly building battlefield local area networks (LAN), reconnaissance and acquisition of enemy network system services and control permissions, information transmission and intelligence interception, and network attack and defense.

- Undersea robotics developer Tianjin Deepinfar Ocean Technology Co., Ltd. (深之蓝科技公司) maintains a maritime detection and rescue militia fendui 50 (海上侦测救援民兵分队). The militia operates as part of the Binhai New District Maritime Detection and Rescue Team in Tianjin. In 2021, the company used its “Pufferfish” underwater remotely operated vehicle and “Seabow” underwater propulsion scooter in a flood control and tide protection emergency rescue exercise.
Notably, neither new-type nor new-quality militias are actually "new". The concept began to be widely promoted in public defense news sources around 2017 after the 19th party congress called for “perfecting the national defense mobilization system”. A Xinhua article described the congress’ call as “the opening of a rebirth to reform” (一场浴火重生的改革拉开大幕) and “rebirth” is likely a fitting description for new-type and new-quality militias as well. The term new-type militia emerged at least as early as 2004. News reports on the development of quality militias as well. The term new-type militia emerged at least as early as 2004. "rebirth" is likely a fitting description for new-type and new-quality militias as well. The term new-type militia emerged at least as early as 2004.66 Local government documents from 2013 likewise reference the “new-type militia force system” as a focus of militia reform.58

Moreover, militias in areas such as cyberspace operations that today are called new-type began emerging in the late 1990s on an experimental basis. China’s 2004 and 2006 national defense white papers also highlighted a number of “specialized technical [militia] units” (专业技术分队) for “communications, engineering, chemical defense, reconnaissance, [and] information”, some of which were likely considered new-type at the time or are considered so today. In 2015, the white paper China’s Military Strategy likely alluded, in part, to continuing militia reform and specialization when it highlighted China’s efforts to “persist in making people's war an important magic weapon for vanquishing enemies, expand the content, form, and methods of people's war, [and] promote the transformation of the focus of war mobilization from manpower mobilization to scientific and technological mobilization”.

Streamlining Militia Organization

The proliferation of new-type and new-quality militia forces since the early 2000s, in conjunction with lingering yet outdated forms of militia construction, likely led to a high degree of variance in forces between localities, unnecessary duplication of skills, and overspecialization of fendui that impaired militia performance. At least as early as September 2012, advocates for creating a “new-type militia force system” within the former Chengdu Military Region’s Mobilization Department (成都军区动员部) called for transforming militia construction from an effort focused on enlisting large numbers of personnel to an effort focused on quality and effectiveness. The draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System appears to shed light on the outcome of the militia streamlining efforts that began in 2016, illuminating the CMC NDMD’s militia force planning scheme.

In 2016, “reducing the size of the militia” was identified as a goal of wider military reforms in China. The government white paper China’s National Defense in the New Era indicates China was still working on “streamlining the number of primary militia nationwide, driving deeper reform of militia and reserve forces in their size, structure and composition [emphasis added]” in 2016. This reform drive has entailed cutting 27.8% of primary militia (基干民兵) personnel — amounting to hundreds of people from a single fendui in some cases — while focusing militia construction on improving fighting strength and increasing “quality and effectiveness” (质量效能). Moreover, “fendui categories under traditional mechanization conditions were reduced by more than half, the number of people reduced by two-thirds”. Militias supporting priority mission areas, such as maritime militias, grew in size. Other aspects of reform efforts included getting rid of overlapping militia teams, creating more multi-functional militia teams, and taking a more unified approach to distributing the construction of various militia teams within a constrained administrative jurisdiction. In some areas, thousands of “traditional” fendui were disbanded or merged.

Beginning on page 244 of the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System is a 10-page “Primary Militia Organization Classification Table” (基础民兵组织分类表) (Figure 10). The table’s contents likely represent a standardization of the types of militia forces (or at least many of them) that the CMC NDMD has identified throughout China or that it has identified as being relevant options for future militia construction efforts. It is not known whether all of the categories of militia fendui at each of the organizational levels discussed below currently exist; some of the included fendui categories could be aspirational. The table may also be incomplete. Nevertheless, it provides a striking view of how China’s new militia forces are likely structured. Pertinent information from this table is summarized below:

- There are 20 listed militia organization types (组织分类) (see Figure 11)
- These organization types are differentiated into 3 categories (种类区分) of militia:
  - 4 of the Emergency Response Forces (应急力量) category
  - 13 of the Specialized Forces (专业力量) category
  - 3 of the Special Forces (特殊力量) category
4 of the militia organization types further comprise several militia organization subdivisions before specific fendui categories are named, such as the Air Defense Militia (防空民兵), which has subdivisions for Air Defense (对空抗击), Camouflage Protection (伪装防护), and Airstrike Aftermath Removal (消除空袭后果); however it is unclear whether these subdivisions constitute organizational groupings (that is, separate militias) themselves as they still fall under the same header (组织分类) in the table.

Across all 20 militia organization types, there are 419 fendui categories at 6 types of organizational levels: 19 battalion headquarters (营部), 20 battalions (营), 1 company headquarters (连部), 136 companies (连), 147 platoons (排), and 85 squads (班); 11 fendui categories do not include an organizational level.

There are 275 unique areas of responsibility served by the 419 fendui categories of the 20 militia organization types, according to the draft document.

Most fendui categories are differentiated by another type (类型) identifier: “specialized” (专业), “new-quality” (新质), or both “specialized” and “new-quality”; here, “specialized” is different from the Specialized Forces (专业力量) militia organization category, but the meaning is unclear; the meaning of “new-quality” is clear, and creates a window into the kinds and missions of new-type or new-quality fendui categories that have emerged since the early 2000s.

All fendui categories are accompanied by a “number of people” (人数) statistic; the exact meaning of “number of people” is not made clear in the document, but it is most likely an indicator of the target size for a fendui of a given category and organizational level, or possibly a minimum size.

See Part 2 of Appendix A for a glossary of terms used in this section related to militia organization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Response (应急) (E)</th>
<th>Stability Maintenance (维稳处突类) (E)</th>
<th>Special Search and Rescue (专业救援类) (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion HQ 1</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion 1</td>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
<td>Battalion 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company HQ 1</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company 1</td>
<td>Company 1</td>
<td>Company 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon 1</td>
<td>Platoon 1</td>
<td>Platoon 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad 0</td>
<td>Squad 2</td>
<td>Squad 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Support Type (勤务保障类) (E)</th>
<th>Maritime Militia (海上民兵) (Z)</th>
<th>Border/Coastal Defense Militia (边海民兵) (Z)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 1</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
<td>Battalion 1</td>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company 0</td>
<td>Company 16</td>
<td>Company 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon 4</td>
<td>Platoon 13</td>
<td>Platoon 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad 1</td>
<td>Squad 7</td>
<td>Squad 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Has 2 additional fendui</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Defense Militia (防空民兵) (Z)</th>
<th>Special Assistance/Support (特种支援保障) (Z)</th>
<th>Engineering Rapid Repair (工程抢修) (Z)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion HQ 3</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 1</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion 3</td>
<td>Battalion 1</td>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company 19</td>
<td>Company 1</td>
<td>Company 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon 15</td>
<td>Platoon 11</td>
<td>Platoon 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad 1</td>
<td>Squad 11</td>
<td>Squad 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Has 4 additional fendui</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical Defense/Rescue (防化救援) (Z)</th>
<th>Transportation and Shipping (交通运输) (Z)</th>
<th>Transport/Road Protection (保交护路) (Z)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
<td>Battalion HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
<td>Battalion 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
<td>Company HQ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company 2</td>
<td>Company 8</td>
<td>Company 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon 2</td>
<td>Platoon 5</td>
<td>Platoon 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad 1</td>
<td>Squad 0</td>
<td>Squad 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 11: Militia organization type, category, and fendui category count by organizational level

"New-Type" Militia Fendui

Statistics available in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System suggest a wide expansion of the skills and roles within China’s militia forces under the new-type concept, at least at the conceptual level. New-type militia force planning is most prominent in relation to maritime reconnaissance, transport, and search and rescue; border and coastal defense, including escort and language interpretation; network (cyber) space capabilities, including network attack and public opinion guidance; and various activities related to intelligence collection, specialized military equipment support, and operations along strategically important frontiers; among other areas.

Out of 419 fendui categories across all 20 militia organization types identified in the draft document, 49% are designated new-quality — the indexing system’s preferred term for new-type militia. More than 10% of fendui categories within most (14) militia organization types are new-quality. There are 7 militia organization types for which the percentage of new-quality fendui categories exceeds 50%. These 7 militia organization types and their areas of responsibilities are profiled in Figure 12.

Although examples of many of the new-type militia fendui categories listed in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System are discoverable in Chinese news reporting, not all are. As mentioned above, it is possible that some fendui categories listed are aspirational. Having been written into the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System, however, more militia fendui based on these categories will likely be created as national defense mobilization institutions of the military and party-state refer to the indexing system as a guide in future militia construction efforts. However, not all localities will establish forces for all militia organizations types or from their corresponding fendui categories. As noted above, this expansion of skills and roles does not point to a growth in the overall size of militia forces.
### Maritime Militia (海上民兵)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% New-Quality</th>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 65% (26 out of 40 fendui categories) | • Maritime Special Reconnaissance (海上特种侦察)  
  • Maritime Remote Sensor and Monitoring (海上遥感监测)  
  • Maritime Undersea Target Detection (水下目标探测)  
  • Maritime Environment Monitoring (海洋环境监测)  
  • Maritime Meteorology and Hydrology (海上气象水文)  
  • Maritime Information Assistance and Support (海上信息支援保障)  
  • Maritime Transport Type 3 (海上运输(三)) (Maritime Transport Type 1 and 2 are not labeled new-quality)  
  • Maritime Search and Rescue Type 2 (海上搜救(二))  
  • Maritime Search and Rescue Type 1 (海上搜救(一))  
  • Maritime Air Search and Rescue (海上空中搜救)  
  • Maritime Special Rescue (海上特种救援)  
  • Maritime Salvage (海上蛙人打捞)  
  • Maritime Ship Repair (海上船舶维修)  
  • Ship Equipment Repair (船舶装备维修)  
  • Maritime Engineering Rapid Repair and Construction Support (海上工程抢修抢建保障)  
  • Far Seas Defense (远海防卫)  
  • Deep Ocean Assistance and Support (深海支援保障)  
  • Maritime Overall Support (海上综合保障)  
  • Maritime Channel Opening (海上航道开辟) |

### Intelligence and Information (情报信息)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% New-Quality</th>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 90% (9 out of 10 fendui categories) | • Escort and Translation/Interpretation (向导翻译)  
  • Special Languages (特种语言)  
  • Big Data (大数据)  
  • Data and Information (数据信息)  
  • Information Support (Service) (信息保障(服务))  
  • Smart Voice (智能语音)  
  • Information Countermeasures (信息对抗) |
### Special Assistance and Support (特种支援保障)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% New-Quality (类型 = 新质)</th>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 92% (23 out of 25 fendui categories) | • Special Sabotage Assistance and Support (特种破袭支援保障)  
• Amphibious Operations Assistance and Support (两栖作战支援保障)  
• Long-Range Attack Assistance and Support (远程打击支援保障)  
• Airborne Operations Assistance and Support (空降作战支援保障)  
• Intelligentized Operations Assistance and Support (智能化作战支援保障)  
• Biological Assistance and Support (生物支援保障)  
• Polar Assistance and Support (极地支援保障)  
• Space Assistance and Support (太空支援保障)  
• Cognitive Assistance and Support (认知支援保障)  
• Unmanned Operations Assistance and Support (无人机作战支援保障)  
• Aviation Assistance and Support (航空支援保障) |

### Equipment Support (装备保障)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% New-Quality (类型 = 新质)</th>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 93% (25 out of 27 fendui categories) | • Mid-Air Fuel Support (空中油料保障)  
• Engineering and Machinery Maintenance (工程机械维修)  
• Special Vehicle Maintenance (特种车辆维修)  
• (High) Artillery Equipment Maintenance (火(高)炮装备维修)  
• Wheeled Armored (Vehicle) Equipment Maintenance (轮式装甲装备维修)  
• Tracked Armored (Vehicle) Equipment Maintenance (履带式装甲装备维修)  
• Radar Equipment Maintenance (雷达装备维修)  
• Photoelectric Interference Equipment Maintenance (光电干扰装备维修)  
• Chemical Defense Equipment Maintenance (防化装备维修)  
• Missile Maintenance (导弹维修)  
• At-Sea Mobile Ship Repair (舰船海上机动修理)  
• Ship Maintenance (船舶维修)  
• Special Equipment Maintenance (特种装备维修)  
• Special Equipment and Technology Support (特种装备技术保障)  
• Special Electronic Installations Maintenance (特种电力设备维修)  
• Airplane Equipment Maintenance (飞机装备维修)  
• Military Motorboat Maintenance (军用汽艇维修)  
• Roll-On/Roll-Off Ship Modification (滚装船改装)  
• Tank Artillery Noise Reduction (坦克火炮降噪)  
• Electronic Warfare Equipment Maintenance (电子战装备维修)  
• Other High/New (Advanced) Equipment Maintenance (其他高新装备维修)  
• Military Aerospace Equipment Maintenance (军事航天装备维修)  
• Optical Instrument Equipment Repair (光学仪器装备修理) |
### Network (Cyber) (网络)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Network Attack (网络攻击)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network Security and Defense (网络安全防护)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Opinion Propaganda (舆论宣传)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network Public Sentiment Monitoring and Guidance (网络舆情监控引导)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Psychological Treatment (心理治疗)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network Maintenance (网络维管)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network Information Reconnaissance (网络信息侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network Status Awareness (网络态势感知)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network Attack and Defense (网络攻防)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Psychological Attack and Defense (心理攻防)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legal Struggle (法理斗争)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% (22 out of 22 fendui categories)

### Reconnaissance and Intelligence Support (侦察情报保障)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reconnaissance (无人机侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rotorcraft Reconnaissance (旋翼机侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Helicopter Aerial Reconnaissance (直升机空中侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Radio Detection (无线电侦测)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electromagnetic Spectrum Detection (电磁频谱侦测)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electronic Countermeasures Reconnaissance (电子对抗侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Charting and Navigation (测绘导航)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meteorological and Hydrological (Information) Support (气象水文保障)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Target Posture Guidance (目标态势引导)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Escort and Translation/Interpretation (向导翻译)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Satellite Telemetry (卫星遥测)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-Spectral Night Vision Equipment Support (多光谱夜视装备保障)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Special Intelligence and Reconnaissance (特种情报侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic Early Warning Assistance and Support (战略预警支援保障)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military Aviation Assistance and Support (军事航天支援保障)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reconnaissance (固定翼飞机侦察)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information Collection (信息侦搜)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% (26 out of 26 fendui categories)
Border and Coastal Defense Militia (边海防民兵)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% New-Quality (类型 = 新质)</th>
<th>New-Quality Fendui Responsibilities Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 100% (8 out of 15 fendui categories) | • Meteorology Support (气象保障)  
• Hydrology Support (水文保障)  
• Special Intelligence and Reconnaissance (特种情报侦察)  
• Escort and Translation/Interpretation (向导翻译)  
• Special Languages (特种语言) |

Figure 12: Militias for which new-type fendui constitute more than 50% of fendui categories (Source: Draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System)

Supporting Operations on the Frontier

A notable trend among the new-type fendui categories listed in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System is a focus on supporting the greater geographic reach of China’s armed forces. Under the Special Assistance and Support militia organization type in particular, there are fendui categories for polar region assistance and support (极地支援保障), space assistance and support (太空支援保障), as well as long-range attack assistance and support (远程打击支援保障). The maritime militia has similarly evolved to include fendui categories for undersea target detection (水下目标探测), far seas defense (远海防卫), and deep ocean assistance and support (深海支援保障). That 65% of maritime militia fendui categories are labeled new-quality further reflects China’s focus on maintaining stability and security along the near seas frontier and pursuit of its significant interests in the South China Sea.

Although research for this report did not uncover much specific information about the activities of these distant geography-oriented fendui, they clearly align with the expanding scope of China’s military priorities. The Academy of Military Science’s Science of Military Strategy asserted as early as 2013 that “space, ... the deep sea, and polar regions ... have become hotspots for strategic struggles” and that a country’s national defense necessitates “the military capability to carry out attack and defense confrontations within [these] global public spaces”.78 Reflecting the importance of these regions to military planning, the 2017 version of Science of Military Strategy published by National Defense University (中国人民解放军国防大学) goes on to provide an entire chapter devoted to “military struggle in new-type domains”, with subsections for space, the deep sea, and polar regions (among these domains, the 2013 version only has a dedicated section for space).79 If the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System is accurate, China’s militias have diversified to support contingencies in these global commons that may present both military and non-military threats to China’s national interests broadly defined.
Militia Contributions to a Taiwan Scenario

The most salient frontier confrontation for which China is preparing regards seizing control of Taiwan. Many of China’s militia forces would likely be involved in various aspects of this scenario, including air defense on the mainland, general logistics support on land and potentially at sea, and cyber and psychological warfare operations support. In this context, one fendui category of the Equipment Support (装备保障) militia organization type stands out: the roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ship modification (滚装船改装) fendui. Research by Conor Kennedy and J. Michael Dahm has shown that the PLA Navy is conducting amphibious military exercises involving RO-RO vessels, likely in preparation for a Taiwan invasion. These exercises “move beyond benign logistics” to include “RO-RO ferries working in concert with larger PLAN amphibious assault ships, deploying first echelon forces offshore in beach landing operations.”

Some vessels partaking in such exercises have been specifically converted after construction and equipped with new ramps that are designed to better withstand waves and facilitate deployment of amphibious military vehicles at sea. What responsibilities roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ship modification fendui could have in the preparation or execution of a Taiwan landing involving RO-RO ships is unclear, in part due to limited public mentions of this fendui category outside of the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System and no insight into what kinds of “modifications” it may be capable of supporting. Notably, this fendui category only exists at the organizational level of a squad (班), likely made up of around 8 people based on the “number of people” (人数) column discussed above.

Insights Into the Sansha City Maritime Militia

The draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System suggests these characteristics may stem from organizational differences. According to the indexing system, China’s Maritime Militia comprises 40 fendui categories across 5 militia organization type subdivisions for Maritime Reconnaissance and Warning (海上侦察警戒), Maritime Transport (海上运输), Maritime Search and Rescue (海上搜救), Maritime Assistance and Support (海上支援保障), and Maritime Rights Protection (海上维权). The latter sub-militia grouping explicitly comprises 3 Maritime Rights Protection fendui categories — Types 1, 2, and 3 at the company (连) level — and 2 Sansha City fendui: the Sansha Maritime Rights Protection Zhidui (三沙海上维权支队) and the Sansha Maritime Rights Protection Zhidui-subordinate Zhongdui (三沙海上维权支队所属中队). Sansha City is the only locality-specific force mentioned in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System, suggesting it operates under a special institutional arrangement. None of the Maritime Rights Protection fendui categories are considered new-quality.

Looking at the “Number of People” (人数) column for these Sansha fendui hints at their approximate size as well: 1,404 persons for the zhidui and 115 persons for the zhongdui. These numbers fall slightly short of the total publicly reported size of the Sansha City maritime militia in 2016: over 1,800. The discrepancy may be explained by the Sansha City maritime militia’s other responsibilities, such as maritime rescue and reconnaissance, which could be undertaken by other categories of fendui as in other locales. However, a clear answer on this point requires additional research.
Outlook

China’s new method for cataloging and accounting for national defense mobilization will likely achieve its intended goal of standardizing how to precisely reference the vast variety of mobilization instruments available, though perfect execution is unlikely. It will very likely take years to fully and accurately implement this new system across the national defense mobilization hierarchy, between localities, and throughout the broader pool of government departments, enterprises, and institutions from which many mobilization instruments are drawn. Still, the ultimate result will likely be a more agile national defense mobilization system that is more effective in resolving threats to the party-state and homeland.

New-type militia forces and modern militia construction concepts are likely to make China's militia more formidable than they have been in the past. However, militia construction efforts continue to face significant challenges, including those related to their training, management, and equipment. Fendui created within enterprises and among their employees can be among the worst-equipped forces, and militia responsibilities create tension with economic priorities. As one business owner reportedly commented in 2016: “there is no problem with supporting armed [forces] work, but ... once [militia] training is organized, normal production at the factory becomes difficult”.

While overcoming the challenges facing militia construction will not be simple, and while resource accounting efforts and the mobilization of those resources when needed will continue to be difficult, reforms efforts are ongoing. It is prudent to assume that many challenges will be overcome in time, and that in a time of need, many of the mobilization resources and militias at China's disposal will play a role in future conflicts and crises. Indeed, despite lingering challenges, many already are being mobilized for activities that affect the international community.
Appendix A: Terms and Definitions


The following terms are used in this report to describe the general organization of more than 3,000 requirements indexed in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System.

National Defense Mobilization Resource Class — Describes a broad type of related requirements, such as all requirements related to Political Mobilization. There are 9 resource classes, which can be viewed in Figure 3.

National Defense Mobilization Resource Subclass — Describes a relatively narrow type of thematically related requirements, such as Legal Service Institutions (subordinate to the Political Mobilization Class). There are 52 of these subclasses, which are listed in Figure 3.

National Defense Mobilization Instrument — Describes the relatively specific requirement (tool or entity) available to the military and party-state during times of national defense mobilization, such as Legal Service Institutions specializing in international maritime law. Examples of mobilization instruments can be found in Figure 4 and Figure 7.

Part 2: Terms for Chinese Militia Organizational Concepts

The following terms are used in this report with reference to the structure and organization of China's armed forces and particularly the militia.

Militia (民兵) — “A mass armed organization under the leadership of the Communist Party of China that [maintains their role in economic] production, [is] a constituent part of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China, [and is] an aid and reserve force force of the People's Liberation Army”.90

Primary Militia (基干民兵) — A major category of militia personnel and reserve force that “receives dedicated resources, troops demobilized from active duty, and training” in preparation for national defense mobilization tasks. Its counterpart is the ordinary militia (普通民兵), which is a “second-level reserve force” of “registered male citizens [similar] to the [United States] Selective Service pool”.91

Militia Organization Type — A grouping of primary militia personnel organized around a specific role as described in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System, such as the maritime militia mainly composed of civilian mariners. There are 20 militia organization types, which are listed in Figure 11.

Fendui (分队) — A grouping of armed forces personnel into “battalions, companies, and platoons, which together comprise the grassroots level, a fendui can also refer to an ad hoc grouping of personnel, usually at the platoon, company, or battalion level, organized for a particular function”.92 The draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System also applies fendui to squads.

Fendui Category — A category of fendui described in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System, such as the maritime remote sensor and monitoring fendui of the maritime militia. The number of fendui categories listed in the National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System (419) is not the same as the number of militia fendui that have been organized in China, which is much higher.

Militia Battalion Headquarters/Company Headquarters (营部 / 连部) — These are “command institutions” for militia forces during wartime, and “work platforms” for militia activities in peacetime. They are staffed by political instructors (教导员) at the battalion level and political directors (指导员) at the company level.93

Battalion, Company, Platoon, Squad (营 / 连 / 排 / 班) — Groupings of armed forces personnel at the grassroots and tactical level.94 “Militia companies or battalions are generally organized in administrative villages” in rural areas; in cities, militia platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments (团) are generally organized in enterprises, work units, and streets”.95 There are no militia regiments listed in the draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System.
The draft National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System provides a “number of people” (人数) statistic for every fendui category at these and the battalion (company) headquarters level. These numbers for each level vary greatly, but the ranges and modes are provided below. The exact meaning of “number of people” is not made clear in the document, but it is most likely an indicator of the target size for a fendui of a given category and organizational level, or possibly a minimum size.

- **Battalion HQ** — Range: 10-42 (Mode: 10; Total No. of Battalion HQ Types = 19)
- **Battalion** — Range: 93-339 (Mode: 310; Total No. of Battalion Types = 20)
- **Company** — HQ Range: 10 (Mode: 10; Total No. of Company HQ Types = 1)
- **Company** — Range: 22-120 (Mode: 50; Total No. of Company Types = 136)
- **Platoon** — Range: 15-34 (Mode: 20; Total No. of Platoon Types = 147)
- **Squad** — Range: 5-10 (Mode: 8; Total No. of Squad Types = 85)

**Zhidui (支队)** — A grouping of armed forces personnel that has no good English translation, though it is sometimes rendered as flotilla, naval ship brigade, or detachment. A zhidui grouping can have subordinate zhongdui groupings, such as the Sansha Maritime Rights Protection Zhidui-subordinate Zhongdui referenced in this report.

**Zhongdui (中队)** — A grouping of armed forces personnel that has no good English translation, though it is sometimes rendered as squadron.
## Appendix B: New-Type/New-Quality Militia Examples

The following table provides additional examples of new-type or new-quality militias that have been established by various local military commands or enterprises in China. It is not intended to be an exhaustive accounting of all such militia forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Photo</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The first network (cyber) militia of Shunde District, Foshan City, Guangdong Province, receives a 5-day group training on network defense tools operation and use, network attack and defense technology, network defense, and network public sentiment monitoring and control (Source: <a href="https://www.sohu%5B.%5Dcom/a/256684029_161795">https://www.sohu[.]com/a/256684029_161795</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/Xd9mb">https://archive.ph/Xd9mb</a>])</td>
<td><img src="https://example.com/network_militia.jpg" alt="Network Militia" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2021, Yongxiu County, Jiujiang City, Jiangxi Province, planned to establish a 20-person “information network attack and defense support platoon” (信息网络攻防支援排) through 5 state-owned enterprises: China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, China Tower, and an unnamed network (cyber) company, as well as an 8-person “intelligence and information team” (情报信息员队伍) through the local public security bureau, emergency management bureau, and meteorological bureau (Source: <a href="http://www.yongxiu%5B.%5Dgov%5B.%5Dcn/xzwgk/zwwgk/jcgk_186164/zcwj/xzfwj/202108/t20210805_5057003.html">http://www.yongxiu[.]gov[.]cn/xzwgk/zwwgk/jcgk_186164/zcwj/xzfwj/202108/t20210805_5057003.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/6LQpo">https://archive.ph/6LQpo</a>])</td>
<td>No Photo Available</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jiangxi Software Vocational University of Technology (江西先锋软件职业技术学院) maintains an information network (cyber) militia fendui that the Jiangxi Province Information Mobilization Office (江西省信息动员办公室) recognized as a “demonstration point” in September 2017 (Source: <a href="http://aj.china%5B.%5Dcom%5B.%5Dcn/contents/104/4291.html">http://aj.china[.]com[.]cn/contents/104/4291.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/MlO3v">https://archive.ph/MlO3v</a>]; <a href="http://www.xiushui%5B.%5Dgov%5B.%5Dcn/xxgk/xzxxgk/sfz/gzdtdt_127970/201809/t20180925_4353901.html">http://www.xiushui[.]gov[.]cn/xxgk/xzxxgk/sfz/gzdtdt_127970/201809/t20180925_4353901.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/tVfbi">https://archive.ph/tVfbi</a>])</td>
<td>No Photo Available</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militia personnel in Shaoyang Cty, Hunan Province, participate in drone operation competition in September 2020, including for delivery and reconnaissance tasks (Source: <a href="http://news.shaoyangnews%5B.%5Dnet/c/202009/14/1272381.html">http://news.shaoyangnews[.]net/c/202009/14/1272381.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/9xb9f">https://archive.ph/9xb9f</a>])</td>
<td><img src="https://example.com/drone_competition.jpg" alt="Drone Competition" /></td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>The first new-type militia drone reconnaissance <em>fendui</em> in Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, was established at AEE Aviation Technology Co., Ltd. (一电航空技术有限公司) on May 19, 2016, is equipped with 9 “far-distance wirelessly controlled, all-weather detection, intelligent control, and automatic navigation” drones (Source: <a href="http://www.xinhuanet%5B.%5Dcom/mil/2016-05/19/c_128997281.htm">http://www.xinhuanet[.]com/mil/2016-05/19/c_128997281.htm</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/2WnZM">https://archive.ph/2WnZM</a>])</td>
<td>![Photo of militia personnel]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructors from a Mianyang City, Sichuan Province, drone company provide basic flight, low-altitude reconnaissance, target lock, and data submission training in August 2021 to militia personnel from Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County and Fucheng District (Source: <a href="https://ex.chinadaily%5B.%5Dcom%5B.%5Dcn/exchange/partners/82/rss/channel/cn/columns/j3u3t6/stories/WS61245c6ba3101e7ce9760016.html">https://ex.chinadaily[.]com[.]cn/exchange/partners/82/rss/channel/cn/columns/j3u3t6/stories/WS61245c6ba3101e7ce9760016.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/6I32y">https://archive.ph/6I32y</a>])</td>
<td>![Photo of instructors and drones]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A drone reconnaissance and rescue platoon (无人机侦察救援排) of Yuanshan Street, Longgang District, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, receives 15-day training in drone operation and maintenance in December 2021 (Source: <a href="http://www.lg%5B.%5Dgov%5B.%5Dcn/xxgk/zwgk/rsxx/gbxpx/content/post_9425996.html">http://www.lg[.]gov[.]cn/xxgk/zwgk/rsxx/gbxpx/content/post_9425996.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/9n4Jy">https://archive.ph/9n4Jy</a>])</td>
<td>![Photo of drone reconnaissance and rescue platoon]</td>
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<tr>
<td>The People’s Armed Forces Department of Dingzhou County, Baoding City, Hebei Province, has a cooperative agreement with Dingzhou Shuaicun Airport (定州帅村机场), which provides training to local militia forces like the Dingzhou drone reconnaissance and rescue platoon (无人机侦察救援排) (Source: <a href="http://www.xinhuanet%5B.%5Dcom/mil/2021-07/06/c_1211229472.htm">http://www.xinhuanet[.]com/mil/2021-07/06/c_1211229472.htm</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/uh5kg">https://archive.ph/uh5kg</a>]; <a href="http://dingzhou.hebei%5B.%5Dcom%5B.%5Dcn/system/2021/01/29/100588142.shtml">http://dingzhou.hebei[.]com[.]cn/system/2021/01/29/100588142.shtml</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/jyJ8Y">https://archive.ph/jyJ8Y</a>])</td>
<td>![Photo of drone]</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>The People's Armed Forces Department of Xiangshan County, Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province, has established a 20-person maritime militia underwater target detection <em>fendui</em> (水下目标探测分队) through Ningbo Senya Electronics Technology Co., Ltd. (宁波盛泽电子科技有限公司) (Source: <a href="http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0523/c1011-31099220.html">http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0523/c1011-31099220.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/BsVHc">https://archive.ph/BsVHc</a>])</td>
<td>No Photo Available</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Shantou City garrison in Guangdong Province created 70 new-type militia <em>fendui</em> in 2020, including those for meteorological and hydrological support, network information support, and drone reconnaissance. The deputy captain (副队长) of the drone reconnaissance <em>fendui</em> is an engineer from Shantou Chaoxiang Drone Technology Co., Ltd. (潮翔无人机科技有限公司) (Source: <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/mobilization/2020-07/09/content_4867812.htm">http://www.mod.gov.cn/mobilization/2020-07/09/content_4867812.htm</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/dysrW">https://archive.ph/dysrW</a>])</td>
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<td>In 2016, the Qinhuangdao City, Hebei Province, military subdistrict created a helicopter rescue <em>fendui</em> (直升机救援分队), likely as part of its 80-person maritime militia emergency rescue company, which also has access to all-weather rescue boats, underwater towed side-scan sonar, life detectors, and plasma cutting machines (Source: <a href="http://www.81.cn/mb/2016-05/25/content_7071517.htm">http://www.81.cn/mb/2016-05/25/content_7071517.htm</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/f25a6">https://archive.ph/f25a6</a>])</td>
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<tr>
<td>A &quot;helicopter <em>fendui</em>&quot; organized by Shanghai Kingwing General Aviation Co. Ltd. (上海金汇通用航空股份有限公司) in Shanghai City's Pudong New District participates in a June 2019 emergency rescue exercise using a type AW139 medical helicopter. Kingwing reportedly maintains a security alert company (连), road transportation company, maritime rescue company, helicopter transport platoon (排), and maritime aerial rescue squad (班) (Source: <a href="https://kknews.cc/zh-cn/military/x2x89n9.html">https://kknews.cc/zh-cn/military/x2x89n9.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/E1L3p">https://archive.ph/E1L3p</a>]; <a href="https://www.thesealitup.com/article/id=3505.html">https://www.thesealitup.com/article/id=3505.html</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/Losr6">https://archive.ph/Losr6</a>])</td>
<td><img src="https://archive.ph/Losr6" alt="Helicopter" /></td>
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<td>Yangshuo County, Guangxi Province, established a helicopter reconnaissance and rescue militia platoon with 2 helicopters in 2020, in part to monitor and report &quot;damage to villages, water reservoirs, and roads&quot; (Source: <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/mobilization/2021-11/29/content_4899947.htm">http://www.mod.gov.cn/mobilization/2021-11/29/content_4899947.htm</a> [<a href="https://archive.ph/wip/z0TJL">https://archive.ph/wip/z0TJL</a>])</td>
<td><img src="https://archive.ph/wip/z0TJL" alt="Helicopters" /></td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>“Registered and requisitioned local information forces” from China Telecom were &quot;organized into an emergency communication fendui&quot; under the Shanghai City garrison command (上海警备区) during militia exercises in November 2017, likely contributing to a new “front-end communications” (前端通) infrastructure (Source: <a href="http://news.sina%5B.%5Dcom%5B.%5Dcn/o/2017-12-08/doc-ifypnyqi1946629.shtml">http://news.sina[.]com[.]cn/o/2017-12-08/doc-ifypnyqi1946629.shtml</a>)</td>
<td><img src="https://archive.ph/YfAdA" alt="Photo" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Under the 13th 5-Year Plan for Militia Construction in Shanghai, the Shanghai City garrison command established a wireless telecommunications support fendui at the Shanghai branch of China Telecom (中国电信上海公司民兵无线通信保障分队) (Source: <a href="http://www.mod%5B.%5Dgov%5B.%5Dcn/power/2019-06/06/content_4843108.htm">http://www.mod[.]gov[.]cn/power/2019-06/06/content_4843108.htm</a>)</td>
<td><img src="https://archive.ph/PpcL0" alt="Photo" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>The 80-person on-water militia search and rescue fendui (水上民兵搜索救援分队) of the Pu’er City, Yunnan Province, military subdistrict conducts fire-fighting exercise on Lancang River in August 2020 (Source: <a href="http://www.mod%5B.%5Dgov%5B.%5Dcn/mobilization/2020-08/11/content_4869423.htm">http://www.mod[.]gov[.]cn/mobilization/2020-08/11/content_4869423.htm</a>)</td>
<td><img src="https://archive.ph/Sjs4O" alt="Photo" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ningbo Guangqiang Robotics Co., Ltd. (宁波市广强机器人科技有限公司) has established a 20-person “multi-function... intelligent robot fendui” in 2019 under the direction of the Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province, military subdistrict for chemical defense, rescue, and data detection (防化、救援、数据检测) tasks (Source: <a href="http://military.people%5B.%5Dcom%5B.%5Dcn/n1/2019/0523/c1011-31099220.html">http://military.people[.]com[.]cn/n1/2019/0523/c1011-31099220.html</a>)</td>
<td><img src="https://archive.ph/BsVHc" alt="Photo" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About the Author

Devin Thorne
Threat Intelligence Analyst, Insikt Group®

Devin Thorne is part of Recorded Future's Global Issues Team. His research strives to explain China's security strategies through primary-language sources, with emphasis on propaganda work, maritime security, and military-civil fusion. He holds a bachelor's from the University of Alabama at Birmingham and a masters from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies. He speaks Mandarin.

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Endnotes

1 MCF is a national-level strategy for balancing security and development by integrating China’s military and civilian spheres to increase "combat readiness and economic benefits" in the short-term, and ultimately establish a "unified military-civil system of strategies and strategic capability" in the long-term (for more, see Alex Stone and Peter Wood, China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Chinese Strategists, China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 15, 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/CA/Display/Article/2217101/chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy/).


5 Ibid.

6 Theater Command Mobilization Bureaus (战区动员局) appear to be located within the theater Joint Staff Departments (战区联合参谋部) and may have internal National Defense Mobilization Offices (国防动员处). For example, see references to the Southern Theater Command Joint Staff Department Mobilization Bureau (南部战区联合参谋部动员局), the Eastern Theater Command Joint Staff Department Mobilization Bureau (东部战区联合参谋部动员局), the Western Theater Command Mobilization Bureau National Defense Mobilization Office (西部战区动员局国防动员处) (see He Zhixiang [何志祥] and Jiang Boxi [姜博茜], “How Does National Defense Mobilization Capacity Become War Readiness Resources?”, People’s Daily Online [人民网], April 25, 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/cj/2017-04/101101.html).


13 Han, Cao, and Jia, "Collect Water Into a Deep Pool".


22 “The document titled National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System that is analyzed in this report was found uploaded to the website of a local industry association as a publicly available PDF in May 2021. The author of this report believes it to be an authentic interim draft of the final statistical indexing system disseminated at the March training conference discussed above based on its level of detail and language, B the methodology behind the document’s creation, and C the document’s timestamp. News reporting on the indexing system from March 2021 says it includes more than 4,400 requirements identified through interviews with military organs, theater commands, and service departments as well as consultation with more than 40 government departments and state-owned enterprises (see Han, Cao, and Jia, “Collect Water Into a Deep Pool”) over a 2 and a half year period. This language in public reporting is almost identical to the language in the PDF that inspection shows was last modified in May 2020 (the title of the PDF file also reflects this time period). There are 2 discrepancies, however. First, the PDF is more detailed than public reporting about the 3-step process used to gather requirements, indicating the number of interviews (39) and conferences (50) held, among other information. Second, the PDF states that it was created following 15 months (rather than a 2 and a half years, or 30 months) of effort and identifies a total of more than 3,500 requirements (rather than 4,400). While the time gap between May 2020 and March 2021 does not fully account for the discrepancy between 15 months and 30 months, only accounting for 25 months, this timeline could explain why the details of public reporting are nearly identical to the PDF but describe a higher output (the increased number of interviews and requirements identified). For these reasons, the PDF is likely a draft of the final National Defense Mobilization Latent Capacity Statistical Survey Indexing System.


28 Han, Cao, and Jia, “Collect Water Into a Deep Pool”.

29 Subclasses are listed [left to right, top to bottom] in the order in which they are presented in the original document.


33 Thorne and Spevack, Harborred Ambitions, 28.


46 Stone and Wood, China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, 100.


63. Hong Xiaorong [洪晓荣] and Guan Yingquan [官应权], “Persist in the “Three Necessities” to Construct a New-Type Militia Force System” [构建新型民兵力量体系坚持“三个必须”], National Defense [国防], No. 9 (2012), 13-14.


65. “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. This eloquent translation is borrowed from Kania and Burns, People’s Warfare Against COVID-19, 12.


68. Gao, Qiao, and Bao, “See the Changes in Militia Team Building Through the New and Old Militia Establishment Tables”.

69. Ibid.

70. Wei, Jiao, and Wang, “Changes in Form, Changes in Equipment, Changes in Training”.

71. The exact distinctions between zhuanye [专业] and teshu [特殊] forces, which can be understood as “specialized” and “special”, are not clear to the author of this report. “Professional” is also an option for translating zhuanye. Government white papers have used both options. In 2006, zhuanye jishu fendui [专业技术分队] was translated as “specialized technical units” in the context of militia building (see China’s National Defense in 2006 and its official English translation available at: https://archive.ph/H6yEg). In 2013, a white paper translated the term in 2 ways, both outside of the militia context: yingji zhuanye liiliang [应急专业力量] was translated as “professional emergency-rescue units” and zhuanye jishu fangkong liiliang [应急专业力量] as “specialized technical protection forces” (see The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces and its official English translation available at: https://archive.ph/waEJp).

72. According to the “Militia Battalion (Company) Headquarters Regularized Construction Standards and Rules” [民兵营（连）部规范化建设标准细则], published on a local government (Chanyuan Village [长源村]) website in 2017, “militia battalion (company) headquarters in wartime are command institutions (指挥机构), in peacekeeping activities (活动阵地) and work platforms (工作平台); they are an important part of militia organization and construction”. The same source indicates that coordination, planning, and oversight of these headquarters is the responsibility of the “military subdistricts (garrison commands) and county (city, district) people’s armed forces departments (军分区(警备区), 县(市,区)人武部). Other sources describe militia battalion and company headquarters as “frontline command departments” (一线指挥部). They are equipped with a work desk, chair, confidential information cabinet, phone, and computer, as well as posters detailing the duties of “battalion (company) commanders and political instructors (political directors)” (政委民兵营(连) 长, 教导员 (指导员) 职责). See “Militia Battalion (Company) Headquarters Regularized Construction Standards and Rules” [民兵营（连）部规范化建设标准细则], Tianhu County Jiuzhen Township Chanyuan Village Vanguard Net [太湖县牛镇镇长源村先锋网], September 21, 2017, http://www.thxj.[gov.cn]/ae/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=1002&id=28252 (https://archive.ph/Grmzd); Qiu Minjun [邱敏军], “Accelerate and Advance the Regularized Construction of People’s Armed Forces Departments and Militia Units” [加快推进人民武装民兵建设] (see People’s Daily Online [人民网], No. 9 (2014), 24; “Notice on Publication of ‘Tianwang Township Rules for Regularized Construction of Militia Battalion (Company) War Preparedness’” [关于印发《天王镇民兵营(连)战备规范化建设规划》的通知], Jurong City Tianwang Township People’s Government [句容市天王镇人民政府], February 14, 2017, http://www.jurong.[gov.cn]/trzw/bmws/201801/ce10166508974612b931e9560dcab602.shtml (https://archive.ph/NFPJN); Nan Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China: From Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization, (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 25.

73. Areas of responsibility are based on the names (名称) of the fendui categories. These names have 2 parts: taking Counter-Terrorism and Stability Maintenance Company (反恐维稳连) as an example, there is a role indicator prefix (反恐维稳) and an organizational level suffix (“Company” [连]) as seen in Figure 10. Stripping the organizational level suffixes from the fendui category names and removing duplicate role indicator prefixes reveals that there are 275 unique areas of responsibility.

74. From left to right, the column headers are “Category Differentiation” (类区区分), “Organization Classification” (组织分类), “Fendui Name” (分队名称), “Code ID” (代码), “Code Number” (编码), “Type” (类型), and “Number of People” (人数).

75. As noted above, not all fendui have an organizational level suffix. These extra fendui are accounted for by the remark denoted by an asterisk (*). Militia organization type category is denoted using “E” for Emergency Response Forces (应急力量), “Z” for Specialized Forces (专业力量), and “S” for Special Forces (特殊力量). For the Service and Branch Support militia organization type, there are subdivisions for the PLA Ground Force (GF), PLA Navy (N), PLA Air Force (AF), and PLA Rocket Force (RF).

76. See Footnote 73 for information on how areas of responsibilities were assessed.

77. Forces that would be organized under the public opinion guidance fendui category of the Network (Cyber) militia organization type are distinct from the “network civilization volunteers” (网络文明志愿者) that some documents describe as a “young army corps” (青年军) or “reserve army” (后备军) (see Ryan Fedasiuk, “A Different Kind of Army: The Militarization of China’s Internet Trolls”, China Brief, No. 21:7 (April 12, 2021), https://jamestown.[org/program/a-different-kind-of-army-the-militarization-of-chinas-internet-trolls/). Network militias constitute an element of China’s armed forces that, in part, undertakes public opinion monitoring and guidance activities. See the following for more discussion of network militias: Sheldon and McReynolds, “Civil-Military Integration and Cybersecurity.”


84 Zhidui (支队) and zhongdui (中队) are groupings of armed forces personnel that have no good English translation, though the former is sometimes rendered as flotilla, naval ship brigade, or detachment and the latter is sometimes rendered as squadron (see “Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts”, in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 52).

85 Haver, “Unmasking China’s Maritime Militia”.

86 Kennedy and Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization”.


91 “Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts”, in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 54.

92 “Appalix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts”, in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 54; Kennedy and Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, 18.


94 “Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts”, in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 54; Kennedy and Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, 18.


96 “Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts”, in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 54; Kennedy and Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, 18.


98 “Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts”, in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 54; Kennedy and Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, 18.